CHAPTER 12

Convergence and Integration

As noted in Chapter 1, one of Bowlby's primary motives in developing attachment theory was to align psychoanalytic theory more closely to scientific findings and perspectives from related disciplines, such as ethology and cognitive psychology. In this way, he believed, he could reform psychoanalysis and preserve the insights it offered, while modifying those formulations that he viewed as untenable and based on outmoded perspectives that needed to be replaced.

Although the crucible for the origins of attachment theory was psychoanalysis, the fact is that attachment research and theory have developed quite independently of psychoanalysis. According to Fonagy (2001), as I have stated, there is "bad blood" between them. In rather stark contrast to the embeddedness of psychoanalysis in clinical work, attachment theory has been closely linked to systematic empirical research, which is generally published not in psychoanalytic but in psychology journals and is carried out by researchers, many of whom have no particular interest in psychoanalysis. In short, attachment theory and research have developed quite independently of psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, as we will see, there are important areas of possible mutual contributions as well as potential convergence and integration between these two perspectives.

My purpose in this final chapter is to identify and discuss these mutual contributions and to point to convergences and possibilities of greater integration between these two perspectives. Fonagy has provided an excellent

chapter entitled "What Do Psychoanalytic Theories and Attachment Theory Have in Common?" in his 2001 book *Attachment and Psychoanalysis*. Fonagy focuses on the common emphasis on the importance of early caregiving; the role of mentalization; the conception of representations of self and other as determinants of interpersonal behavior; the relationship context of cognitive development; and the fundamental motivations for forming relationships. I will not duplicate his efforts. Rather, I limit my discussion to selected points of convergence between attachment and psychoanalytic theories that supplement Fonagy's chapter. Even when I do discuss the same topics covered by Fonagy, I do so from a somewhat different perspective. The topics I discuss in this chapter are (1) the basis for infant–mother attachment; (2) the importance of mentalization and reflective function in classical and contemporary psychoanalytic theories; (3) the role of adequate caregiving in optimal development; (4) the role of fantasy and actual events in influencing representations and development; (5) restrictions on experience; (6) persistence of early modes of relating; (7) ego functions and attachment; and (8) interpersonalizing of defense.

THE BASIS FOR INFANT–MOTHER ATTACHMENT

I have already noted in previous chapters various points of convergence between attachment theory and psychoanalysis. They include, for example, an emphasis on early experiences in influencing personality development and the role of the therapist as a base from which the patient can engage in self-exploration.

Also, as noted in Chapter 1, Bowlby (1958) identified early psychoanalytic precursors to attachment theory. They include Ferenczi's (1933) concept of "passive object love"; Balint's (1937) concept of "primary object love," which according to him is not linked to any of the erotogenic zones "but is something, on its own" (p. 15); Hermann's (1933, 1936) positing of an instinct to cling; and Suttie's (1935/1988) identification of "instincts adapted to infancy," the predominant component of which is "a simple attachment to mother" (p. 15).

Bowlby also notes that when Burlingham and Freud (1944) actually observed children, their descriptions are quite different from Anna Freud's theoretical formulations, which stress hunger reduction and the pleasures associated with infantile sexuality as the basis for attachment. For example, based on the observations of children in the Hampstead Nurseries, they write that "children will cling even to mothers who are continually cross and sometimes cruel to them. The attachment of the small child to

his mother seems to a large degree independent of her personal qualities" (p. 47). In that same paper, they describe the child's need "for early attachment as an important instinctual need" (p. 22).

As is the case with Burlingham and Freud, when Klein actually observes infants, her descriptions are quite different from her theoretical formulations. Bowlby cites the following passage from Klein's writings:

> Some children who, although good feeders, are not markedly greedy, show unmistakable signs of love and of a developing interest in the mother at very early stages—an attitude which contains some essential elements of an object-relation. I have seen babies as young as three weeks interrupt their sucking for a short time to play with the mother's breast or to look towards her face. I have also observed that young infants—even as early as in the second month—would in wakeful periods after the feeding lie on the mother's lap, look up at her, listen to her voice and respond to it by their facial expression; it was like a loving conversation between mother and baby. Such behavior implies that gratification is as much related to the object, which gives the food as to the food itself. (Klein et al., 1952, p. 239)

Bowlby cites Ribble's (1943) conclusion that there is an "innate need for contact with the mother" (Bowlby, 1958, p. 373), but notes that she links this need to "satisfactory functioning of physiological processes" (p. 373) rather than "a social bond developing in its own right" (p. 373). Here, it seems to me, Bowlby does not fully appreciate Ribble's prescience in anticipating the idea that the mother's role in regulating the infant's physiological (and correspondingly affective) processes may constitute a basis for later psychological attachment to mother—a formulation more fully developed in the work of Hofer and his colleagues (see Chapter 3).

Bowlby also notes Freud's flirtations—and they are only flirtations that are not developed further—with the idea that the infant's attachment to mother may be independent of both hunger reduction and pleasures from erogenous zones. As we have seen in Chapter 8, Freud (1912/1957) refers to the "affectionate current" that is directed to "members of the family and those who look after the child" and "corresponds to the child's primary object choice" (pp. 180–181).

Freud suggests that the "affectionate current, which is 'older' and predates the 'sensual' current, is the basis for the infant's primary object choice." As I have noted elsewhere, "Freud, in effect, is proposing that the infant's attachment to the caregiver is based on a system that predates and that, therefore, is initially independent of infantile sexuality" (Eagle, 2007, pp. 46–47). Freud does not further develop the implications

of this proposal. Had he done so, he might have abandoned his secondary drive theory and more fully anticipated important aspects of attachment theory.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MENTALIZATION AND REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING CAPACITY IN ATTACHMENT THEORY AND CLASSIC PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

Distinction between Mentalization and Reflective Function

In this section I discuss the common emphasis on the importance of mentalization and reflective capacity in optimal functioning in both classical psychoanalytic theory and attachment theory. Before doing so, however, I want to make what I believe is an important distinction between mentalization and reflective function. According to Jurist et al. (2008), "the construct of reflective functioning … is essentially an operationalization of mentalization" (p. 2). But, it seems that this cannot be right for a number of reasons. Mentalization refers to the capacity to take an "intentional stance" (Dennett, 1987) toward oneself and others, that is, to view behavior in terms of mental states (i.e., aims, intentions, desires, etc.) that the behaviors convey. As Bateman and Fonagy (2006) put it, "mentalizing simply implies a focus on mental states in oneself or in others, particularly in explanations of behavior" (p. 1). As Bateman and Fonagy also note, "mentalization is procedural, mostly non-conscious" (p. 3). Further, Gergely and Unoka (2008) argue that research suggests that mentalization begins as early as 1 year of age.

One would surely not want to say that *reflecting* on one's own and others' mental states is mostly nonconscious or that it begins at 1 year of age. In short, one can mentalize in the sense of (often automatically) taking an intentional stance toward oneself and others without necessarily reflecting on what one has mentalized. As we see later in the chapter, strong unregulated affects are often triggered by automatic attribution of hostile and rejecting intentions to others, which then justifies one's own hostile intentions (see Dodge et al., 1995). In these instances, an intentional stance *is* taken by the individual. That is, the other's behavior is, indeed, explained by reference to his or her intentions and aims. Failure to take an intentional stance is not the problem. The problem is (1) that the attribution of intentions to the other is fixed and rigid and not infrequently, the product of projection and (2) that the individual is not able to *reflect* on his or her attributions, that is, on what he or she has mentalized. Not uncommonly, a vicious circle develops characterized by (1) the triggering of strong negative

affects resulting from particular attributions to the other, (2) the failure to reflect on one's attributions due, in part, to the experience of intense negative affect, and (3) attributions that remain unquestioned and continue to "justify" intense negative affect.

Mentalization, Attachment Theory, and Psychoanalysis

Whether or not mentalization-based therapy is based on attachment theory (see Chapter 10), there is nevertheless convergence between classical psychoanalytic theory and attachment theory on the enhancement of reflective functioning as a central therapeutic goal. As Allen, Fonagy, and Bateman (2008) observe, although Freud did not use the term "mentalizing," he essentially originated the concept in his early writings. For example, in his conception of the somatic symptoms of hysteria, he placed great stress on the importance of transforming the somatic into thought—which can be seen as an early precursor of the goal of making the unconscious conscious (see Bucci, 1997, for a contemporary version of the transformation of the subsymbolic into the symbolic as the core psychoanalytic goal). Mentalization is also implicit in Freud's discussion of the origin of thinking and in the importance of inserting thought between impulses and action. This is yet another precursor of the goal of making the unconscious conscious understood as the transformation of what is not thought into what is thought.

In the clinical psychoanalytic context, the role of reflective function is perhaps most clearly expressed in the primacy of strengthening the observing function of the ego as a central treatment goal (Sterba, 1934). This is an especially important idea insofar as it emphasizes the enhancement of an ego function rather than the bringing of specific repressed memories, wishes, and fantasies into consciousness. This change in emphasis from uncovering repressed mental contents to enhancing the observing function of the ego is succinctly captured in the shift from making the unconscious conscious to "where id was, there shall ego be" (Freud, 1933, p. 80) as a central goal of psychoanalytic treatment. The emphasis is now not only or perhaps not primarily on bringing material to consciousness, but also on reflecting on what is now in conscious awareness. Insofar as one can understand reflective capacity as an ego function, the goal of strengthening ego functions includes the enhancement of mentalization and reflective capacity. Recent work on mentalization at least partly inspired by attachment theory expands the psychoanalytic goal of strengthening the observing function of the ego by including in that function the capacity to reflect on the mental states of others.

The Importance of Reflective Function in Later Psychoanalytic Theories

The emphasis on enhancing reflective function—even if that term may not be employed—comes to the fore and becomes increasingly explicit in the work of those contemporary analysts who focus on analysis of defense. In the view of contemporary ego psychologists such as Gray (1994), Sugarman (2006), and Busch (2009), the main function of interpretation is not to uncover repressed wishes and fantasies, but to enhance the patient's curiosity about and capacity for understanding how his or her mind works. In effect, Gray and his colleagues are describing mentalization and reflective function.

An assumption shared by both attachment theory and psychoanalysis is that enhancement of the capacity for reflection serves as an affect regulator and as a barrier against the "thoughtless" automatic repetition of maladaptive patterns. Many patients, particularly those suffering from borderline and narcissistic disorders, tend to construe and experience the behavior of others as rejecting, humiliating, and so on (see Gunderson & Lyons-Ruth, 2008, for evidence that borderline patients are rejection sensitive). Their reactions to such experiences often trigger uncontrollable negative affects and wreak havoc in their relationships.

This phenomenon is nicely illustrated in a clinical example provided by Gabbard and Horowitz (2009). The patient reports an incident in which she experienced a sales clerk's refusal to accept her credit card as an affront and reacted by creating a scene in the store. In response to her therapist's question as to whether the sales clerk's refusal to accept her credit card was store policy, the patient reacts with rage, accusing her therapist of taking the sales clerk's side. In the throes of her emotional reaction, she does not seem capable of reflecting on her construal of the sales clerk's intentions.

In my own clinical work I have been struck with the frequency with which these unquestioned attributions to others of intentions to humiliate are made, their role in triggering a spiral of destructive negative affects and behaviors, and the affect-regulating efficacy of reflecting on these attributions. As an example of these phenomena, a patient reported her father's response to her phone call to pick her up at the train station with the suggestion that she take a taxi (because he was having his dinner) as an egregious example of his rejection of her. In the past, this sort of experience would lead to the following sequence: rage, accompanied by such thoughts as "I never want to see him again. I don't need him. I don't need anybody"; inability to sustain these "resolutions"; feeling "weak" and dependent; depression; suicidal thoughts. During this session (after a good deal

of previous work), she was able to reflect on both her own feelings of rejection and her own wishes in relation to her father as well as on her father's perspective (i.e., his wish to eat his dinner rather than his intention to reject her or his not caring about her). This newfound capacity for mentalization and reflection—which my patient described as her new "tool"—served to prevent the destructive sequence I have described above.

Both Gabbard and Horowitz's patient and my patient, in her initial construal of her father's behavior, *are* mentalizing in the sense that they are attributing aims and intentions to the other—intentions to reject and humiliate, for example. However, they experience their own reactions as well as their attributions to the other as absolute and unquestioned, and not subject to evaluation and reflection. Hence, their failure lies not in an incapacity to mentalize, but in a relative incapacity to reflect on what they mentalize.

One can see in these examples another phenomenon highlighted by Fonagy and his colleagues, namely, either the interference with mentalization or the increased rigidity of reflective function when strong affect is aroused. In the case of my patient, the intense affect is clearly related to the activation of her attachment system, that is, wanting her father to be there as a safe haven.

One can also observe failures of reflective function when an individual engages in projection. That is, one projects, say, a hostile wish on to another, then attributes hostility to the other, and then experiences the other as hostile. The one doing the projecting is engaging in mentalization, that is, is taking an "intentional stance"; he or she is attributing certain intentions and aims to the other. However, he or she has not been capable of reflecting on either his or her own or the other's mental states. The projector does not reflect on the possibility that he or she may be angry and that his or her attribution of hostility to the other may be mistaken (or perhaps induced by his or her own behavior).

As we have seen, the caregiver's failure to reflect on either her own or her infant's mental states is hypothesized to contribute to the infant's insecure attachment. Another factor is the tendency of the caregiver to project conflict-laden thoughts, feelings, and motives on to her infant. Recall Lieberman's (1999) description of an interaction in which mother, who is having her lunch, keeps her hungry crying infant, whom she describes as "greedy," waiting until she finishes her own lunch. It is apparent from the material that mother unconsciously views her own neediness as greed and projects these feelings on to her infant. Here, once again, the problem lies not in incapacity to mentalize or take an "intentional stance." Indeed, mother overattributes intentions and feelings to her infant. The problem

is that mother is not aware that the intentions and feelings attributed to her infant have little to do with what the infant is intending and feeling. Rather, they are projections of mother's intentions and feelings—a quintessential example of bringing "ghosts into the nursery" (Fraiberg, Adelson, & Shapiro, 1975). Thus, mother's behavior can be understood as a form of mentalization—or perhaps one should say pseudomentalization—in which, although an intentional stance is taken, the intentions attributed to the other are projections of one's own.

One sees a similar pattern in child abuse in which the caregiver attributes to the infant motives and intentions that are "complementary" to and serve to justify the caregiver's negative reactions to the infant. For example, if the caregiver is enraged by the infant's incessant crying, it follows that the infant is *intending* to harass and enrage her by continuing to cry. Again, this is not a matter of failure to take an intentional stance, but rather a matter of overattributing intentions that serve to justify one's own mental state.

THE ROLE OF ADEQUATE CAREGIVING IN OPTIMAL DEVELOPMENT

Convergence between Attachment Theory and Winnicott's Formulations

As Fonagy (2001) notes, a "radical claim" made by Winnicott (1965) is that the development of the child's ego functions is influenced by the caregiver's responses to the child, a claim that accords with the evidence that the caregiver's sensitive responsiveness influences the development of the child's cognitive functioning. Although few would be surprised by this relationship today, Fonagy quite rightly refers to Winnicott's claim as a "radical" new one.

As discussed in Chapter 3, according to psychoanalytic ego psychology, cognitive functions could develop autonomously of drive gratification in an "average expectable environment" (Hartmann, 1958). This acknowledgment of the autonomy of ego functions was heralded as an advance in psychoanalytic theorizing that reflected what we had learned about autonomous and genetically programmed maturational processes. Although psychoanalytic theorists, such as Spitz, for example, were certainly aware of the dire effects of environments outside the average expectable range—maternal deprivation is an obvious example—little attention was paid to the possibility that subtle variations *within* an "average expectable environment" may produce individual differences in cognitive (and social) functioning. In other words, drawing upon attachment theory and employing the language of psychoanalytic theory, one can say that although ego functioning may develop autonomously in relation to drive gratification, it is nevertheless

influenced by variations in object relations within the boundaries of an "average expectable range."

Points of Convergence between Kohut's Self Psychology and Attachment Theory

The importance of the caregiver's sensitive responsiveness for the development of secure attachment in attachment theory and Kohut's (1984) emphasis on parental empathic understanding in the development of a cohesive self represent a clear case of a general convergence. However, whether there is a more fine-grained convergence between the two perspectives can only be determined by comparing the specific behavioral and personality characteristics that each perspective emphasizes. Attachment theory identifies insecure attachment as a consequence of lack of parental responsiveness, whereas self psychology focuses on the lack of self-cohesiveness as a consequence of lack of parental empathic mirroring and understanding. Is there a relationship between insecure attachment and lack of self-cohesiveness? How would the latter be assessed? Would operationalizing empathic mirroring and sensitive responsiveness point to the same or different aspects of parental behavior?

As we have seen in previous chapters, attachment research has shown that insecure and particularly disorganized attachment are predictive of a range of certain maladaptive cognitive and social behaviors as well as increased risk for certain forms of psychopathology. According to self-psychology theory, failure to develop a cohesive self is also correlated with certain behaviors (e.g., grandiosity) as well as increased proneness to certain forms of psychopathology (e.g., narcissistic personality disorder). What is the relationship between these two sets of correlates and predictions? Until these questions are empirically investigated, we do not know the specific degree of convergence between self psychology and attachment theory.

THE ROLE OF FANTASY AND ACTUAL EVENTS IN INFLUENCING REPRESENTATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The longstanding debate between attachment theory and psychoanalysis on the role of fantasy versus actual events in shaping development merits further discussion and unpacking. I will try to show that there are certain points of convergence (as well as divergence) between these two perspectives. As noted in a previous chapter, I do not think it is true that Kleinian

and Freudian theory totally ignore the role of actual events or that attachment theory totally overlooks the role of fantasy. The differences between them are more subtle than that.

A careful reading of Bowlby's objections to Kleinian theory suggests that they can be broken down into a number of explicit and implicit components which, though related to each other, are nevertheless separable. One component is the criticism that Kleinian theory ignores the role of actual events in the development of the infant and child. A second component is the criticism that Kleinian theory places an excessive emphasis on the role of fantasy in understanding the infant's and child's development and psychological life. A third more implicit component is the rejection of the Kleinian assumption that the infant's and child's fantasies are generated, not by actual events, but by *endogenous* drives, particularly the death instinct. A fourth, also implicit, component is the skepticism directed toward the kind of florid and complex fantasies attributed to infants by Klein and Kleinian theorists. I think one can add a fifth component, which consists in Bowlby's claim that from the start that infant is capable of reality testing rather than having to rely on a complex set of projective and introjective processes in order to "construct" an external world. These latter components may not have been all explicitly stated by Bowlby. However, I believe that they are at least implicit aspects of Bowlby's general attitude and skepticism toward Kleinian theory.

Not all the above criticisms are equally justifiable. The passage cited from Rivière in Chapter 1, and Bowlby's response to it ("role of environment = 0") notwithstanding, as we have seen in a previous chapter, Kleinian theory does not discount the role of actual events in the development of the child. Although the emphasis on endogenous instincts remains, an assumption of Kleinian theory is that one needs good object experiences in order to modulate hate and destructiveness emanating from the death instinct and to strengthen object love and the life instinct. For example, as Segal (1964) writes, "when there is a predominance of good experience over bad experience, the ego acquires a belief in the prevalence of the ideal object over the persecutory objects, and also the predominance of its own life instinct over its own death instinct" (p. 24). Although this may not be the role that Bowlby would give to actual experience, it certainly does not entail an utter neglect of actual events.

In its reaction against Kleinian theory, attachment theory appears to leave little room for the role of fantasy of any kind as well as the idiosyncratic ways in which the child may experience actual events—what in the psychoanalytic context is referred to as "psychic reality." By calling attention to fantasy and the idiosyncratic ways in which the child experiences

actual events, I do not have in mind the florid fantasies of the devouring breast or urethral attacks attributed to the infant by Klein. There is not an iota of evidence for the existence of such fantasies (how would one even obtain such evidence?); and everything that we know about the infant's capacities—as impressive as they are—strongly suggests that they are not capable of such cognitive activities. What I have in mind is the role of such factors as immature cognition and temperament in influencing how actual events are experienced by the infant and child. It is likely, for example, that infants with different thresholds for frustration will encode the same objective event (e.g., number of minutes waiting to be fed) differently (Eagle, 1995). We also know that young children often understand events in idiosyncratic ways. For example, a young child may experience a caregiver's depression as rejection and/or as caused by his or her demands. Or he or she may experience parental divorce as his or her fault. Also, as Fairbairn (1952) observes, the young child may experience himself or herself as "bad" in order to maintain a representation of the caregiver as "good" and thus keep some semblance of hope alive.

Bowlby himself, as well as attachment theorists and researchers, appear to recognize and acknowledge that representation of early experiences are not simply accurate records of actual events. Bowlby (1973) notes, for example, the existence of incompatible representational models, only one of which—the unconscious one—reflects what the child actually experienced. The other conscious representational model, Bowlby tells us, reflects parental communications that may or may not be congruent with the child's experiences. For example, the child may have felt rejected by his or her caregiver, while at the same time being told by the caregiver what a loving mother she is.[1] Thus, the individual's conscious working model may include the fantasy of a perfectly loving mother. One sees this phenomenon in the idealization of the parental figure seen in AAI narratives (unaccompanied by specific episodic instantiations) as well as the parental idealization often observed in mistreated and abused children.

Thus, even from the perspective of attachment theory, it is not the case that representations reflect, simply and directly, early actual events or early actual experiences. The conscious representational model based on parental communications to which Bowlby refers hardly reflects actual events with "tolerable accuracy." Rather, it is the "distorted" and fantasy-influenced product of the defense against the anxiety generated by parental

[1]Bowlby (1973) states that "the hypothesis of multiple models, one of which is highly influential but relatively or completely unconscious, is no more than a version, in different terms, of Freud's hypothesis of a dynamic unconscious" (p. 205).

prohibitions and threats to the relationship with the attachment figure. For example, the threats may take the form of implicitly demanding "that the child accept the parental version by threatening to abandon or eject him, or else to become ill or commit suicide" (Bowlby, 1973, p. 318). In effect, Bowlby is acknowledging the role of defense and fantasy in influencing the child's representational model. What he insists on—in my view, justifiably—is that the child's defenses and fantasies are generated not solely or mainly by endogenous drives, but by actual experiences with caregivers. One can capture the essential difference here between Kleinian theory and attachment theory by saying that whereas in the former, reality is constructed (through projection and introjection processes) out of fantasy (that is, linked to endogenous instincts and drives), from an attachment theory perspective, fantasy develops out of the elaborations of experience of actual events in reality. This perspective is also shared by a number of contemporary psychoanalytic theories.[2]

Consider as a concrete example the concept of castration anxiety. According to the classical psychoanalytic view, during the Oedipal phase of psychosexual development, the boy experiences incestuous wishes toward mother and hostile or death wishes toward father. These wishes are endogenously generated in the course of psychosexual development. Castration anxiety is experienced as a feared retribution for harboring these wishes. According to the traditional view, although parental threats may occur, castration anxiety need not entail actual specific parental threats of castration. Rather, it may be based mainly on the child's fantasy of the kind of punishment that would fit the crime.

Contrast this view with Weiss and Sampson's (1986) understanding of this phenomenon. First, they refer to castration anxiety as a general metaphor for the child's fear of bodily harm associated with "dangerous" and forbidden strivings. Most important, these strivings are not necessarily inherently dangerous but have been rendered so through parental communications. Thus, based on these communications, a child may experience normal ambitions and strivings for independence and separation as entailing harm to parents.

On Weiss and Sampson's view, this is not because the child necessarily

[2]There is somewhat of a contradiction in Kleinian theory regarding the role of external reality, including actual events, in external reality, in psychological functioning. On the one hand, as noted above, there is the recognition that actual events, such as good object experiences, can modulate and temper the impact of the death instinct. However, if reality is constructed out of and is the product of projective and introjective processes, then there are no actual events that are even relatively independent of the projection and introjection of fantasies linked to life and death instincts and could therefore contribute to the construction of external reality.

has fundamental and inherent antisocial wishes to harm the parent, but because the parent has communicated the message to the effect that "if you separate and lead an independent life, you will be destroying me," or, to take another example, "if you succeed in your ambitions and outdo me, you will cause me great harm." In other words, the child's unconscious representations and beliefs now include *symbolic equivalences* between certain strivings and harming parents (Eagle, 1987).

Weiss (1982) describes a patient whose father was crippled in an automobile accident when the patient was 5 years old and when he was struggling to be independent. There was evidence that the young boy developed the belief that his attempt to become independent somehow caused his father's disability, and he continued to associate his striving for independence with harm to his father. One can speculate that the young boy's construal of the meaning of his father's accident was, at least in large part, a product not only of immature cognition and the time in his life at which the accident occurred (i.e., when he was striving for independence), but also of the pre-accident parental communication conveying the message that striving for independence was somehow harmful to father.

One can think of these "symbolic equivalences" as fantasies based on actual events. For example, following, say, father's depression or competitiveness or anger following a child's expressions of ambition or outstanding achievement, he or she may come to feel that there is something inherently dangerous or bad or destructive about being ambitious and excelling. Although the father's depression or competitiveness following the child's achievements are actual events, the child may elaborate in fantasy the dangerousness or "badness" of his or her ambitions and strivings.

Consider as another example a child's "average expectable" neediness being met with a response of irritability and tiredness from a depressed parent. The child may develop a symbolic equivalence between expression of his or her normal needs and harming and displeasing parent in some way. Furthermore, the degree of harm to parent may be greatly elaborated in fantasy such that any feeling or expression of need is unconsciously experienced as destroying the other (see Fairbairn, 1952).

In summary, an attachment theory perspective is virtually identical with the view of those contemporary psychoanalytic theorists who reject Freud's positing of universal endogenous antisocial fantasies and wishes that need to be tamed. Instead, they emphasize the role of parental threats and prohibitions in relation to the child's pursuit of basic needs and normal strivings, which are then experienced as "dangerous," conflictual, anxiety-laden, and not to be consciously pursued or experienced. However, what is underemphasized in an attachment theory perspective is the degree to

which fantasy elaborations of actual events may contribute to anxiety-laden representations.

It seems to me that the differences between the Kleinian and Freudian theory and attachment theory—as well as the differences between Freudian and Kleinian theory and some contemporary psychoanalytic theories—are not simply a matter of fantasy versus actual events. Rather, the differences have mainly to do with the origins, nature, and role of fantasy in the life of the child. To some extent, these differences reflect fundamentally different conceptions of human nature.

RESTRICTIONS ON EXPERIENCE: WHAT IS THE CHILD NOT ALLOWED TO THINK AND FEEL?

A central point made by Bowlby is that the anxiety generated by fear of loss, rejection, and threats to the attachment bond influence what one is "allowed" to consciously think and feel . Whatever other differences there are between them, in an important sense, Bowlby's emphasis on parental communications in influencing what the child can and cannot experience is entirely compatible with Freud's discussion of the role of the "danger situations" (e.g., loss of the object; loss of the object's love) in keeping certain thoughts and feelings from being consciously experienced. Where they differ is their sharply different ideas on (1) what thoughts and feelings parents are telling the child he or she is not allowed to consciously experience and (2) the origin and nature of these thoughts and feelings. For Freud, parental prohibitions and threats are directed toward the child's endogenously generated sexual and aggressive thoughts and feelings. The classic example is, of course, the incestuous and hostile wishes that make up the Oedipus complex. Further, according to Freudian theory, in prohibiting these thoughts and feelings and withdrawing love when they are expressed, parents are carrying out a necessary *socializing* function as societal surrogates.

In contrast, for Bowlby, parental prohibitions, threats, and related communications are directed, not toward endogenously generated sexual and aggressive wishes, but toward such aspects of the child's life as wanting to be fed on time (see Lieberman, 1999), wanting to be soothed and comforted, wanting to be accepted and loved, and wanting to have the attachment figure available as a secure base for exploration. In addition, as we have seen, according to Bowlby, parental prohibitions and communications are also directed toward protecting their image as loving parents. To be noted here is that in stark contrast to the Freudian view, little in

attachment theory speaks to the socializing function of parental prohibitions and threats. Attachment theory does not appear to posit inherently unruly asocial or antisocial urges and impulses that require parental threats and prohibitions to be tamed and socialized.

PERSISTENCE OF EARLY MODES OF RELATING

Common to attachment theory and psychoanalysis is the assumption that a central feature of psychopathology is the persistence of early modes of relating which, whatever adaptive purposes they may have served in childhood, have become maladaptive. However, attachment theory and psychoanalysis account for the persistence of early modes of relating in different ways. According to attachment theory, these patterns were originally motivated by attempts to have one's attachment needs met in whatever way possible and to avoid the pain of rejection. However, over time they have become habitual and persist into adulthood.

According to Fairbairn (1952), the persistence of early modes of relating is motivated by the individual's "devotion" and "obstinate attachment" to early objects (a phenomenon one often sees in clinical work). From Fairbairn's perspective, the persistence of early modes of relating, which would presumably also include early attachment patterns, is a way of maintaining a kind of loyalty and connection to early objects. Such "devotion" and "obstinate attachment," Fairbairn tells us, provides a sense of inner cognitive and affective connection that is necessary for ego functioning. As Jones (1952) writes in the preface to Fairbairn's book:

> If it were possible to condense Dr. Fairbairn's new ideas into one sentence, it might run somewhat as follows: Instead of starting, as Freud did, from stimulation of the nervous system proceeding from excitation of various erotogenous zones and internal tension arising from gonadic activity, Dr. Fairbairn starts at the centre of the personality, the ego, and depicts its strivings and difficulties in its endeavor to reach an object where it may find support. (p. v)

According to Fairbairn, the direst psychological state that an individual can face is to experience an empty inner world devoid of inner connections to objects. Therefore, we cling to any objects, including "bad" objects. Note that for Fairbairn the function of the object and object relations goes beyond the provision of soothing and comforting (the safe haven function) or of a secure base for exploration. A challenge for future work is the integration of this fundamental function of the object identified by

Fairbairn into an attachment theory conceptualization of the functions of the attachment figure.

Kohut's (1984) identification of the role of the object—or as he puts it, the selfobject—in maintaining self-cohesiveness and self-esteem also speaks to an important function of the attachment figure that goes beyond issues of "felt security" and the provision of a safe haven and secure base. Again, one can ask whether this aspect of the function of the attachment figure can be integrated into attachment theory and research.

There is little doubt that one confronts in clinical work the kinds of phenomena identified in Fairbairn's and Kohut's formulations. That is, one sees patients who are intensely attached to an attachment figure who does not seem to be available as either a safe haven or secure base, but is nevertheless experienced, as one of my patients put it, as a "lifeline," as vital to self-integrity and intactness. This kind of profound and intense attachment, which seems related to and yet appears to go beyond the safe haven and secure base functions of the attachment figure identified by attachment theory, needs to be more fully understood and integrated into attachment theory and research.

On a less intense and dramatic level, it is not uncommon in clinical work to encounter patients whose clinging to their attachment figure, despite much conflict and distress, seems to be maintained by the fantasy that someday and somehow they will get what they need from him or her—that is, as one of my patients ironically put it, that they will "live happily ever after." What is striking about this wan and poignant hope is its utter contrast with the stark reality of the actual relationship. Striking—and clinically most compelling—is the persistence of this fantasy, the intense longing accompanying it, and the profound feeling expressed by the patient in one way or another—that life would indeed be bleak and virtually not worth living were this fantasy to be relinquished. What makes this clinical pattern especially relevant to attachment theory is that it appears to be present virtually exclusively in relation to the patient's attachment figure.

Fairbairn (1952) refers to the alluring or exciting as well as rejecting aspects of the attachment figure (of course, he does not use the term "attachment figure"). According to Fairbairn, from an intrapsychic perspective, what truly constitutes a "bad" object is not simply rejection, but the combination of promise or allure and rejection. This sets up an inner state in which one cannot relinquish the fantasy that the object (i.e., attachment figure) will someday fulfill that promise. Furthermore, the individual's affective life is organized around this fantasy, the relinquishment of which is, as noted, often experienced as an unbearable loss. Hence, the individual

clings to the object despite much suffering. Mitchell (1988) goes further in suggesting that it is the very suffering that contributes to the tenacity of the attachment bond because it serves to preserve the continuity, connections, familiarity of one's personal, "interactional world" (p. 33).

EGO FUNCTIONS AND ATTACHMENT

Freud linked the development of cognition and reality testing to drive gratification, specifically, to the failure of wishful hallucination to gratify the hunger drive. As a "corrective" to this formulation, psychoanalytic ego psychologists reorganized autonomous ego functions such as competence and mastery (Hendricks, 1943; White, 1959, 1960). Most important, Hartmann (1958) proposed that in an "average expectable environment," ego functions would develop as part of a normal maturational process.

What ego psychology did not do was (1) link the development of ego functions to the availability of the attachment figures and (2) link individual differences in ego functions to variations in the degree and nature of the attachment figure's availability. It was left to attachment theory to recognize that successful exploration of the world—a critical aspect of ego functioning and reality-testing—requires the availability of the attachment figure and the exercise of his or her secure base function. This function of the attachment figure finds no clearly articulated counterpart in classical theory or, as I understand them, in ego psychology, self psychology, or relational psychoanalysis. This constitutes an important contribution of attachment theory and research to an understanding of the development of ego functions.

As noted previously, Hartmann's formulation of ego autonomy in an "average expectable environment" did not seem to include the recognition that variations in caregiving behavior within an "average expectable environment" can have an impact on the development of ego functions and on the child's capacity for relatively comfortable exploration of the world. Thus, whereas ego functions could be autonomous in the sense of relative independence from drive, attachment research has shown that they are not fully autonomous in the sense of relative independence from the vicissitudes of infant–mother interaction.

As discussed earlier, the consequences of extreme maternal deprivation of which Spitz and other ego psychologists were aware were outside the range of an "average expectable environment." What they were not apparently aware of were the more subtle effects on ego functioning of variations and patterns of infant–caregiver interactions that lay *within*

the "average expectable environment." These variations and patterns of caregiving do not determine whether ego functions will develop. That is a matter of normal maturational processes (in that sense they are autonomous). However, as a great deal of attachment research has shown, they do influence the way that ego functions such as cognitive and social abilities and defensive patterns develop. Here is obviously another area where attachment theory and research findings have important implications for psychoanalytic theory, in particular, for a theory of the nature and development of ego functions.

INTERPERSONALIZING OF DEFENSE

Although, according to a classic psychoanalytic view, defense originates in interactional experiences (e.g., the child's response to the "danger situations"), once they are established, they are essentially intrapsychic processes. For example, repression operates intrapsychically to keep certain thoughts and feelings from being consciously experienced. And, in adapting the concept of repression to attachment theory, Bowlby (1988) also describes avoidant attachment pattern as an intrapsychic process entailing "defensive exclusion" of attachment-related thoughts and feelings.

However, attachment patterns as defenses also include interpersonal communications and behaviors that have interpersonal consequences. For example, an avoidant attachment pattern entails certain *behaviors*, such as avoidance of intimacy, behaviors that trigger prophecy-fulfilling complementary responses in others, such as withdrawal and rejection. The interpersonal nature and consequences of the enmeshed/preoccupied attachment pattern is even more evident. This pattern is characterized not only by an internal or intrapsychic chronic preoccupation with abandonment, but also by certain forms of behavior directed toward others—for example, angry demandingness—which has interpersonal consequences, including increasing the risk of bringing about the very abandonment that is also deeply feared.[3] It seems to me that attachment research on the interactive

[3]In the psychoanalytic context, what one might call the interpersonalization of defense is seen in the currently popular concept of projective identification, as elaborated by Ogden (1982). On that view, individual *A* not only projects an unacceptable wish or aspect of himself or herself to the individual *B*—which could remain at a purely intrapsychic level—but also *induces* individual *B* to feel and act in a certain way. Hence, an intrapsychic defense is transformed to include an interpersonal aspect. It is interesting to observe that of all the defenses formulated by Freud and Anna Freud, it is projection that is directed outward and that is inherently interpersonal, or using contemporary language, two-person rather than one-person. That is, one projects something about oneself onto another person and then experiences as well as relates to that person in a different way.

context and interpersonal consequences of different attachment patterns can enrich the psychoanalytic concept of defense.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

To what extent can attachment research and theory and psychoanalytic theories be integrated? There are two possibilities. One is the current state of affairs characterized by two different theories, different domains, different traditions, different methods, and different sources of data, with interesting connections between them. The other possibility lies in attempts at integration of the kinds of phenomena and data that I have described into attachment theory and research. For example, the concept of an internal working model can be expanded to include such phenomena as "devotion" and "obstinate attachment" to early objects and guilt-motivated unconscious pathogenic beliefs identified in psychoanalytic theory.

Of course, one can start with the phenomena and data that are identified by attachment theory and research and ask whether they can be integrated into psychoanalytic theory. The latter seems a more difficult task because, in contrast to the relatively unified status of attachment theory, we know what its core tenets and propositions are—psychoanalytic theory is characterized by different "schools" and little consensus on core tenets and propositions.

One of the most fruitful potential consequences of a greater integration between attachment theory and research and psychoanalysis is the exploration, fleshing out, and testing, in a language susceptible to empirical investigation and to interdisciplinary integration, the implications of psychoanalytic formulations. To a certain extent, this has already been done. For example, Fairbairn's (1952) claim that "libido is object-seeking" or Balint's (1937/1965) concept of "primary object love" can be embedded in a broad evolutionary and empirically grounded context. This is also the case for more recent psychoanalytic concepts and formulations. For example, Mitchell (1988) writes that from the perspective of relational psychoanalysis, mind is made up of "relational configurations" (p. 3) (rather than a "cauldron full of seething excitations" [Freud, p. 84]). One can think of Bowlby's concept of the internal working model and many of the research findings on attachment patterns as "fleshing out" this view of the mind. This is not simply a matter of translation. Rather, it is a matter of giving these concepts empirical reference and embedding them in an accompanying research program.

In doing the necessary thinking, reading, and research in writing this

book, I have been struck by a clear contrast between attachment and psychoanalytic theories in their respective practices, values, and attitudes, particularly in regard to how each discipline goes about developing knowledge, constructing theory, and resolving conflicting hypotheses and formulations. It is, of course, true that insofar as psychoanalysis is also a form of treatment, one would expect certain differences with regard to goals and practices. However, insofar as psychoanalysis is also a *theory*, (Indeed, Strachey [1937, p. 212] suggests that Freud "was always eager to direct attention to the importance of the non-therapeutic interests of psychoanalysis, the direction in which lay his own personal preferences, particularly in the later part of his life."), the issue of clinical focus cannot account for all the differences in practices, values, and attitudes between attachment and psychoanalytic theories.

I was particularly struck by the differences between the two disciplines in reviewing the perplexing issue of the relationship between maternal sensitivity and infant attachment status. Let me re-trace that issue as a means of highlighting the contrast between the practices of attachment and psychoanalytic theories. As noted, according to attachment theory, there should be a robust relationship between the two—a finding reported by Ainsworth et al. (1978). And yet, that robust relationship did not appear to be generally found. How can one account for that? One possibility, as we have seen, is that maternal sensitivity was not adequately measured. And, indeed, the more the measurement of maternal sensitivity resembled the Ainsworth et al. (1978) assessment, the stronger the relationship between maternal sensitivity and infant attachment status (De Wolff & van IJzendoorn, 1997). However, in no study reviewed in De Wolff and van IJzendoorn's meta-analysis was the relationship between maternal sensitivity and infant attachment as strong as that reported by Ainsworth et al. (1978).

Further progress in shedding light on the issue is provided by three additional sets of findings: One, because maternal behaviors other than sensitivity influence the child's development, including his or her attachment status, one should perhaps not expect as strong a relationship between sensitivity and attachment as originally proposed. Two, contextual factors, such as socioeconomic status and family conflict, moderate the influence of maternal sensitivity. And three, and especially interesting and provocative, is the finding that genetically based individual differences in susceptibility to rearing influences appear to moderate the effects of maternal behaviors on the child's development, including his or her attachment status. In short, there is a systematic effort, based on empirical evidence, to clarify a puzzling and complex issue in a piecemeal and cumulative way.

Contrastingly, in the psychoanalytic context, theoretical claims, for

example, on the relationship between early experiences and later development, are often based on authoritative generalizations from clinical experience with one or two cases. Freud's universalization of findings from single cases set a precedent for this practice. Also, as we have seen, theoretical generalizations are almost always based on "follow-back" data from patients in treatment, which paints a misleading etiological picture. And finally, there is little effort to modify claims through systematic empirical investigation. Rather, different theoretical claims are presented in the context of competing "schools" associated with the formulations of charismatic leaders.

Perhaps, then, the most important general contribution attachment theory and research can make to psychoanalysis is providing a model for integrating clinical and theoretical concepts and formulations with a broad empirical research program. They can also serve as a model for theory building and for adjudicating debates on clinical and theoretical questions on the basis of careful conceptual analysis and empirical data rather than citations of presumably authoritative authors accompanied by selective clinical vignettes. Finally, the history of attachment theory can also serve as a model for an openness to formulations and findings from other disciplines.

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