PART I

THE FIVE PARADIGMS AND THEIR CONVERGENCES

1

The Psychodynamic Paradigm

> Properly speaking, the unconscious is the real psychic; its inner nature is just as unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is just as imperfectly reported to us through the data of consciousness as is the external world through the indications of our sensory organs.
>
> —FREUD (1900, p. 486)

THE TWO DISCIPLINES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

As may be seen from Table Int.3 of the Introduction, the writings of Sigmund Freud provided the initial conceptual bases for three of the five paradigms of personality assessment considered in this book, and a case could be made for his having had some influence on the remaining two paradigms as well. However, the nature of Freud's influence on different paradigms varied in ways that will become evident in this chapter and in the chapters to follow, which emphasize differences among paradigms. In Chapter 6, I consider the differences and similarities between the psychodynamic paradigm and each of the other paradigms. Underlying these differences and similarities is a fundamental conceptual distinction between the drive/structure and relations/structure models of psychoanalytic theory—a distinction that was first emphasized by Greenberg and Mitchell (1983).

Drive/Structure Model

Freud's original psychoanalytic model was stated in the language of the biological and physical sciences of the 19th century, in terms of energy, force, and structure; "structure" was defined as psychological processes characterized by a relatively slow rate of change (Rapaport, 1959b). The principal energy sources of human behavior were held to be innate and largely unconscious sexual and aggressive drives that are directed toward "objects"

(persons) in the environment, and that are opposed by both external and internalized societal prohibitions. In this model, "cathexes"[1] of external objects serve mainly as vehicles through which instinctual energies are discharged.

Relations/Structure Model

In a radical departure from Freud's drive/structure model, Harry Stack Sullivan (1953b) maintained that human behavior is comprehensible only within the context of interpersonal relations, the "relatively enduring patterns of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life" (p. 111). As Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) noted, "Every major feature of Sullivan's theory reflects his shift from Freud's drive/structure theory to relational/structural premises" (p. 100). Whereas Freud's model is primarily "biological," Sullivan's is primarily sociological and cultural.

> The models, to use Kuhn's term, are "incommensurable"; they rest on fundamentally different a priori premises. Any dialogue between their adherents, although useful in forcing a fuller articulation of the two models, ultimately falls short of a meaningful resolution. (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 404)

Relational Psychoanalysis

During the years since Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) declared the drive/structure and relations/structure models to be "incommensurable," there appears to have been a shift in the received view on this matter. Greenberg (1998) has qualified the original Greenberg–Mitchell position by emphasizing changes that had occurred in the use of the term "relational" since their earlier book. In their original usage, Greenberg and Mitchell meant to distinguish orthodox "drive/structure" theorists (such as Freud, Hartmann, and Rapaport) from "relational" theorists (such as Sullivan, Thompson, and Fromm).

Freud's earliest versions of the drive/structure perspective focused on inherent biological drives that presumably "provide the energy for, and the goals of, all mental activity" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 3). In order to incorporate "object relations" into this theory, it was necessary to view relationships as "vicissitudes" of drives that facilitate or inhibit drive discharge. Thus "all facets of personality and psychopathology are understood essentially as a function, a derivative, of drives and their transformations" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 3).

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[1] Investment of feelings or emotions in others.

In contrast to the drive/structure perspective, the "relational" theorists assume that we humans are "genetically predisposed to relate to others—relating to others is not a byproduct of something else (i.e., drive discharge or gratification)" (Eagle, 2000, p. 674). This school of thought includes such theorists as Sullivan (1953b), Thompson (1964), and Fromm (1947), as well as "object relations" theorists such as Fairbairn (1952), Guntrip (1961), and Winnicott (1965).

More recently, there has occurred what one reviewer described as a "miniparadigm shift" in classical psychoanalysis (Eagle, 2000) with respect to what is now called "relational psychoanalysis" (Mitchell & Aron, 1999). Although the two models may not be "incommensurable," they are sufficiently different to be treated separately, as I have done in this chapter and the next. Subsequent developments within the drive/structure theoretical framework, such as object relations theory, were attempts to incorporate interpersonal relations within the drive/structure model, and these developments are discussed in the present chapter. Further complicating matters, an even greater crossover has recently occurred within object relations theory; this is known as "attachment theory." Although attachment theory has historical roots in the drive/structure model, it is clearly based on a relations/structure model, and for that reason is mentioned in this chapter. Finally, in Chapter 6 I argue that on a higher level of abstraction, the drive/structure and relations/structure models are not necessarily "incommensurable."

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE PSYCHODYNAMIC PARADIGM

Of the five paradigms of personality assessment to be considered in this book, the psychodynamic paradigm is by far the most conceptually rich, stemming as it does from the elaborate theoretical edifice of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theory of personality. The psychodynamic paradigm is distinguished not so much by the assessment instruments employed within it, but by the conceptual framework that guides the interpretation of results obtained from these instruments. Thus, although the Rorschach inkblot test was originally the principal assessment instrument employed within the psychodynamic paradigm, the test itself is now frequently employed without reference to any theory at all (e.g., Exner, 1993).

Because Freud aspired to nothing less than a complete theoretical account of the workings of the human mind, his work has been frequently evaluated from philosophical as well as psychological perspectives (e.g., Bouveresse, 1995; Grunbaum, 1993). Therefore, it is not surprising that within the psychodynamic paradigm itself, conceptual issues have been as numerous as empirical issues. This is particularly true of psychoanalytic

"metapsychology"—Freud's (1917) term for the study of the assumptions upon which the system of psychoanalytic theory is based.

The Assumptions and Points of View of Psychoanalytic Metapsychology

In response to a request from the American Psychological Association to summarize the scientific status of psychoanalytic theory, David Rapaport (1959b) produced what can only be described as a masterpiece of formal systematization: He integrated the historical background and metapsychological assumptions of the theory in modern terms, while retaining and extending Freud's original concepts expressed in the natural science terminology of "structures," "forces," and "energies."

In his papers on metapsychology, Freud (1915–1917) discussed the basic conceptual assumptions underlying his evolving theory of the mind. In their totality, these papers provide a chronicle of the occasionally contradictory revisions and elaborations of his basic concepts over time. Rapaport's (1959b) incomparable achievement was to organize and formalize the minimal set of assumptions underlying psychoanalytic theory that he considered both necessary to and sufficient for a complete explanation of human behavior. A basic premise of psychoanalytic theory is that behavior is *multiply determined*. The different sources of determination may be thought of as different conceptual "points of view" on the same behavior sequence (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). These viewpoints, and the metapsychological concepts on which they are focused, appear in Table 1.1.

Freud's earliest writings emphasized the motivating forces of largely unconscious sexual and aggressive drives (dynamic) and their vicissitudes in a prohibitive society (economic). His original topographic conception of the mind (unconscious, preconscious, conscious) was never explicitly replaced by a structural viewpoint (Rapaport & Gill, 1959), the latter being one of Rapaport's more enduring clarifications. Similarly, although psychoanalytic theory is clearly a genetic psychology, Freud did not formulate this explicitly.[2] The adaptive point of view was clarified in the ego psychology of Hartmann, Erikson, and Rapaport, all of whom argued that this point of view had always been implied in Freud's work.

The Language of Psychoanalysis

> [Psychoanalysts] have attempted to formulate explanations of action in the mode . . . of natural science explanation. . . . In line with this strategy, reasons become *forces*, emphases become *energies*, activity becomes *function*, thoughts become

[2] The term "genetic" in psychoanalytic theory concerns developmental experiences, as indicated in Table 1.1, not biogenetic heritability.

> *representations*, affects become *discharges* or signals, deeds become *resultants*, and particular ways of struggling with the inevitable diversity of intentions, feelings and situations become *structures*, *mechanisms*, and *adaptations*.
>
> —SCHAFER (1976, p. 103; emphasis added)

Although Freud's metapsychology was initially meant to clarify the precise nature of his constructs, his use of the language of 19th-century natural science to describe the relations among his constructs eventually generated more heat than light, as it were. For example, his mechanistic, anthropomorphic personifications of metapsychological constructs "interacting" with each other (e.g., instinctual energy vs. countercathectic forces) generally lacked any reference to what actual persons might be doing or in what situations they might be doing it. These ambiguities posed serious problems for both analytic practitioners and theorists. Some practitioners found it difficult to "translate" back and forth between metapsychological constructs and the lives and problems of their patients. By the 1960s, a considerable number of theorists had become highly critical of this metapsychological "language problem" (e.g., Grossman & Simon, 1969; Guntrip, 1967; Holt, 1965; Home, 1966; Klein, 1967; Rycroft, 1966). It was in this context that Roy Schafer (1976) boldly published a book proposing *A New Language for Psychoanalysis*.

Using the writings of prominent linguistic philosophers as a guide (e.g., Austin, 1970; Hampshire, 1959; Ryle, 1949; Wittgenstein, 1958), Schafer devised an "action language" for psychoanalysis, with the fundamental rule that

> we shall not use nouns or adjectives to refer to psychological processes, events, etc. In this, we should avoid substantive designations of actions as well as adjectival or traitlike designations of modes of action. Thus, we

TABLE 1.1. Metapsychological Points of View in Psychoanalytic Theory

Viewpoint	Focus
Dynamic	Instinctual forces and the directionality they impart to behavior
Economic	Instinctual energies and the manner in which they are discharged, distributed, and transformed
Structural	Psychological processes characterized by a relatively slow rate of change and by a permanence of organization and function
Genetic	History and development of mental life, and the manner in which past experiences influence current structures and functions
Adaptive	Manner in which the organism affects adaptive coordinations between instinctual drives and the demands of external reality

Note. Data from Rapaport (1959b).

> should not use such phrases as "a strong ego," "the dynamic unconscious," "the inner world," "libidinal energy," "rigid defense," "an intense emotion," "autonomous ego function," and "instinctual drive." (Schafer, 1976, p. 9)

The bulk of Schafer's revolutionary book is devoted to reworking the language describing the fundamental concepts of psychoanalytic metapsychology into an unambiguous language of action and modes of action. Schafer's perspective, although much more detailed and rigorous, was not entirely "new" to classical psychoanalytic thought. Psychoanalysts have always been aware of their analysands' tendencies to deny or to be unaware of their *own* contributions "to such puzzling or seemingly absurd phenomena as dreams, symptoms, errors, repetitive self-injurious behavior, and emotionality that is inappropriate in kind or object or intensity" (Schafer, 1976, p. 61). And in the classical analytic intervention strategy, "The patient's attention is drawn to his own *activity*; *he himself* has been bringing about that which up to now he has thought he was experiencing passively" (Fenichel, 1941, p. 52; emphasis in original). By emphasizing the problematic actions of the analysand, Schafer's reworking of the formal language of psychoanalytic metapsychology reconciled the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, and thus must be counted among the more salutary and original contributions to the psychodynamic paradigm.

With reference to the quotation from Schafer given at the beginning of this section, it might be said that Schafer, and the considerable number of contemporary psychodynamic theorists who share his sentiments, have "reversed" Freud's original translations. "Force" has become reason, "energies" have become emphases, "function" has become activity, and so on. Within psychoanalytic metapsychology, the formal replacement of natural science metaphors with psychological constructs is similar to what Kuhn (1996) has called a "paradigm shift."

Evolving Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Personality

Psychoanalytic Characterology

The notion of "character" forms the earliest link between psychoanalytic theory and personality assessment. In Allport's (1937) classic distinction, "*Character is personality evaluated, and personality is character devaluated*" (p. 52; emphasis in original). Because "character" implies a moral evaluation of an individual's comportment, Allport suggested that the term not be used in the objective study of personality. However, within early psychoanalytic medical practice, the term "character" was used to denote what was "wrong" with a person, and that usage persists. In later psychiat-

ric nosology, the phrase "character disorders" was employed to describe persons who behaved in unacceptable (antisocial) ways, and the current term "personality disorders" (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) retains a similar evaluative component. Indeed, such expressions as "personality *assessment*," "personality *evaluation*," and "personality *appraisal*" are still with us today.

The conceptual history of psychoanalytic characterology has been a checkered one. Within classical psychoanalysis, the focus was on the vicissitudes of infantile instinctual development that are prolonged or sublimated in adult character traits. Freud (1908) was the first to note the relation between anal eroticism (or, as the *Standard Edition* spelled it, "erotism") in children and the characterological triad of orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy in the adult "anal character." Abraham (1921) expanded this conception with clinical data, and later gave extended accounts of "oral character" and "genital character" as well. Freud (1931) returned to the concept of character with a tripartite classification based on his structural theory of "id" (erotic type), "ego" (narcissistic type), and "superego" (obsessional type). Reich's (1933) later concept of "character armor" stressed the adaptive limitations on character flexibility imposed by ego defenses against repressed instincts, and he did so with a considerably broader range of character types (e.g., passive–feminine, paranoid–aggressive, masochistic).

The paradox of psychoanalytic characterology became evident in the contrast between the intuitive appeal of certain clusters of adult personality traits (such as the anal triad of orderliness–parsimony–obstinacy) on the one hand, and the lack of empirical evidence from prospective studies establishing linkages with early experiences (e.g., toilet training) on the other. Such paradoxes highlighted the need for an ego psychology that would extend the scope of classical psychoanalytic theory by emphasizing such aspects of the ego as cognitions, attitudes, and modes of experiencing affect. More than 30 years passed before Shapiro (1965, 1981) attempted to resolve this paradox by offering an ego-psychological formulation of neurotic styles. Such styles are "ways of thinking and perceiving, ways of experiencing emotion, modes of subjective experience in general, and modes of activity that are associated with various pathologies" (Shapiro, 1965, p. 1). Shapiro's (1965) formulations of obsessive–compulsive, paranoid, hysterical, and impulsive "styles" are classics of the ego-psychological perspective.

Ego Psychology

In Freud's tripartite division of personality structure into id, ego, and superego, the ego was assigned a rather impotent and ambiguous role in the development of the individual and in the individual's adjustment to changing

social environments. The ego was seen as "the helpless rider of the id horse" (Rapaport, 1959a, p. 9). Psychoanalytic ego psychology was (and is) an attempt to extend classical psychoanalysis by revising Freudian concepts related to the ego, while retaining much of the original theoretical framework.

Freud's original notion of ego made reference to the "person" or "conscious self." Memories that are incompatible with the conscious self (particularly sexual seduction by an adult) were thought to be dissociated from consciousness. When Freud discovered that reports of infantile seduction were based on fantasies rather than on actual occurrences, he temporarily put aside the role of reality experience in psychosexual development and returned to his original emphasis on instinctual drives and their derivatives. His later concepts of the reality principle and of secondary process extended the role of the ego somewhat, but without granting the ego an energy source that was independent of instinctual drives. Later, in "The Ego and the Id," Freud (1923) described the ego as a coherent organization of mental processes, but he still did not provide the ego with independent (from drive) energy of its own. Over time, the ego concept assumed a less subservient role in Freud's theory; eventually, in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," Freud (1937) implied that the ego might have independent energy sources of its own (see Rapaport, 1959a, p. 11).

Heinz Hartmann (1939) provided a systematic account of an ego that has independent (from drive) energy sources from birth and that operates in a conflict-free ego sphere:

> I refer to the development *outside of conflict* of perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking, language, recall phenomena, productivity, to the well-known phases of motor development, grasping, crawling, walking, and to the maturation and learning processes implicit in all of these and many others. (p. 8; emphasis in original)

It should be clear from this quotation alone that ego psychology aspires to be a general psychology (Loewenstein, Newman, Schur, & Solnit, 1966) of contemporary rather than of historical significance, and that it is much more compatible with mainstream psychological research and theory.

Object Relations Theory

. . . recent developments within psychoanalytic theory are an integral part of an attempt to extend the "experience-distant" metapsychology, which uses concepts of structures, forces, and energies to describe the functioning of the mind—concepts based primarily on a model related to the natural sciences, to a more "experience-near" clinical theory . . . primarily concerned with concepts of self and others in a representational world.

—BLATT and LERNER (1983b, p. 88)

The generally increased emphasis upon ego functions in postclassical psychoanalysis was also reflected in the currently important psychodynamic alternative of object relations theory. Proponents of this view challenged the classical idea that cathexes of external "objects" (persons) serve mainly as vehicles through which instinctual energies are discharged. Instead, it was postulated that early interactions with significant others ("objects") lead to internalized representations of both others (Jacobson, 1954; Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962) and self (Kohut, 1971) that serve as "internal working models" (Bowlby, 1973) for later interpersonal relationships. From this perspective, the person is, from birth (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985), an object seeker (Fairbairn, 1952; Winnicott, 1965) who establishes a "gratifying involvement" with other persons (Behrends & Blatt, 1985).

As will become evident in this chapter, the shift in emphasis within psychoanalytic theory from the early characterology based on drives, to the ego-psychological perspective, and finally to the internalized representations of object relations theory is to some extent paralleled in the corresponding shifts in rationales for personality assessment from the ego-psychological approach to character assessment (e.g., Prelinger & Zimet, 1964), to the more general ego-psychological approach (e.g., Allison, Blatt, & Zimet, 1988), and more recently to the object relations perspective (e.g., Blatt & Lerner, 1983a).

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF PROJECTIVE METHODS

> Coming directly to the topic of projective methods for personality study, we may say that the dynamic conception of personality as a process of organizing experience and structuralizing life space in a field, leads to the problem of how we can reveal the way an individual personality organizes experience, in order to disclose or at least gain insight into that individual's private world of meanings, significances, patterns, and feelings.
>
> —FRANK (1939, p. 402)

As will become apparent in both the present chapter and the one to follow, advances in physics in general and the formulations of physical field theory in particular had a decided influence on the conceptual foundations of both the psychodynamic and interpersonal paradigms of personality assessment. With respect to the psychodynamic paradigm, Lawrence K. Frank's (1939) article "Projective Methods for the Study of Personality" became an instant classic within the psychodynamic paradigm, and it is still widely cited today. Using Kurt Lewin's (1935) notion of "structuralizing" one's life space according to one's private world, Frank argued that this principle of organizing experience "leads to the problem of how we can reveal the way an individual personality organizes experience, in order to disclose or at least

gain insight into that individual's private world of meanings, significances, patterns, and feelings" (p. 402).

THE PSYCHODYNAMIC TRADITION IN CLINICAL PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

David Rapaport was not only a major systematizer of psychoanalytic theory; he was the originator of a now standard psychodiagnostic test battery and a highly influential mentor of the principal architects of the psychodynamic tradition in personality assessment. After receiving his PhD from the Royal Hungarian University, he emigrated to the United States in 1938 and shortly thereafter joined the staff of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas, where he eventually became chief psychologist and head of the Research Department. During and shortly after World War II, the results of an extensive program of collaborative research were summarized in a two-volume *Manual of Diagnostic Psychological Testing* (Rapaport, 1944–1946), which eventually "revolutionized clinical psychology and influenced clinical psychologists the world over" (Gill & Klein, 1967, p.18). While at Menninger, Rapaport developed an internship program for graduate students in psychology that emphasized psychodiagnostic assessment with a standard test battery (Rapaport & Schafer, 1946). This program (Challman, 1947) consolidated the psychodynamic paradigm by training many of its future contributors.

In 1948, Rapaport moved to the Austin Riggs Center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts and continued his extensive collaborations with colleagues at such institutions as the Menninger Foundation, the Yale University Department of Psychiatry, and the Research Center for Mental Health at New York University. Speaking collectively for workers at these and other institutions, Roy Schafer (1967) observed that "All of us are working within the psychoanalytic psychodiagnostic tradition crystallized by David Rapaport" (p. 2). The Rapaport disciples whose work is considered in the present chapter are listed in Table 1.2.

At the Menninger Clinic, Rapaport was assisted by Merton Gill, a psychiatrist; Martin Mayman, a psychology intern; and the precocious Roy Schafer, who had a bachelor's degree at the time. All three of these clinicians would later have distinguished careers in their own right. Rapaport and several other members of the Menninger staff moved to the Austin Riggs Center and were later joined there by Erik Erikson and by Roy Schafer (who had, in the interim, completed his doctorate at Clark University). Under the tutelage of this distinguished group, David Shapiro produced his classic *Neurotic Styles* (1965). Schafer eventually left Austin Riggs to accept a position as chief of the Psychology Section in the Department of Psychiatry at Yale University. While at Yale, Schafer recruited Carl

TABLE 1.2. Genealogy of the Psychodynamic Paradigm

Menninger Foundation	Austin Riggs Center	Yale University
David Rapaport	David Rapaport	
Merton Gill	Erik Erikson	
Roy Schafer	Roy Schafer	Roy Schafer
Martin Mayman	David Shapiro	Carl Zimet
		Sidney Blatt

Zimet for a staff position in the Department of Psychiatry. The circuitous route whereby Sidney Blatt arrived at the Yale University Department of Psychiatry is a story in itself (see Auerbach, 1999). But the collaboration of Blatt, Zimet, and Allison (who had interned with Schafer) resulted in a textbook (Allison, Blatt, & Zimet,[3] 1988) that contributed to the continuing survival of the Rapaport tradition in psychodiagnostic testing.

THE MENNINGER ASSESSMENT BATTERY

Rationale

Prior to Rapaport's writings in the 1940s, assessment psychologists were primarily technicians who administered IQ tests. Since that time, they have become clinicians who administer batteries of both structured and projective tests of personality and cognition. At Menninger, a multitest battery was advocated in view of the apparent complexity of personality and cognition and their interrelated functions, as well as for the purpose of gathering normative data that would shed light on those complexities (Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1946). The composition of the battery reflected judgments regarding the potential of each instrument to yield measures that might be interpreted within the ego-psychological framework of Rapaport and his associates.

Composition

The projective component of the original Menninger battery included the Rorschach test (Rorschach, 1921), the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935), and a locally constructed Word Association Test. The nonprojective component included the Bellevue Scale (Wechsler, 1941), the Babcock Test of mental efficiency (Babcock, 1933), the Sorting Test of concept formation (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941), and Hanfmann

[3] "The authors are listed in alphabetical order and each of us came to this task better equipped because of contact with Roy Schafer as colleague or teacher" (p. x).

and Kasanin's (1937) test of concept formation. Experience with this battery led to the deletion of Hanfmann–Kasanin and Babcock instruments, as well as a revision of the Word Association Test items (Schafer, 1948). As this revised test battery evolved over a 20-year period, the Rorschach, the TAT, and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1958) became the more or less standard core of the psychodynamic test battery (e.g., Allison et al., 1988) to which a variety of supplemental tests might be added (e.g., Sentence Completion, Draw-a-Person, and Bender Gestalt; see Piotrowski & Zalewski, 1993).

Interpretive Principles

Only a few tests have been constructed specifically for use within a classical psychoanalytic framework (e.g., Blum, 1968). The major assessment instruments employed in the Menninger battery were all originally developed in quite different theoretical contexts. Rorschach may never have intended his test to be interpreted in terms of psychoanalytic theory (Exner, 1974, p. 222); Murray developed his elaborate taxonomy of needs and the TAT in reaction to the paucity of drive variables postulated by psychoanalytic theory (Anderson, 1988); and, perhaps most obviously, the mental testing tradition within which the WAIS was constructed bears little resemblance to the psychodynamic tradition. The vast literature on psychodynamic interpretive principles associated with the instruments employed in the Menninger battery defies easy summarization. The following statements are meant to convey only some of the flavor of three, among many, interpretive principles.

Projective Hypothesis

The projective hypothesis states that "All behavior manifestations of the human being, including the least and the most significant, are revealing and expressive of his personality, by which we mean that individual principle of which he is the carrier" (Rapaport, 1942, p. 92). Thus an individual's possessions—clothes, automobile, furniture—are expressive of his or her personality and reflect single acts of choice; in their totality, they reflect the organization of such choices (Frank, 1939). Responses to the ambiguous stimuli of projective tests may also be thought of in terms of "choice," although such choices are much less conscious or volitional in nature. Thus responses to a Rorschach inkblot may be thought of as reflecting "choices" between forms, colors, shadings, and so forth, to which a subject imparts meaning through organization. Responses to a TAT card also involve both choice (e.g., with which figure to identify) and organization (e.g., sequence of events) (Rapaport, 1942, pp. 92–94). Responses to intelligence and concept formation tests involving choice and organizational processes may be

used as "nonprojective tests of personality," given an adequate theory of "functions underlying the reactions and achievements on these tests" (Rapaport, 1946, p. 228).

Levels of Functioning

The psychoanalytic model of primary (pleasure principle) and secondary (reality principle) modes of thought is meant to account both for a developmental sequence and for characteristics of the mature adult (Rapaport, 1951). Consequently, there is a *continuum* of adult psychological functioning that may be assessed with an appropriate battery of tests.

> This continuum ranges from functioning in situations which put a premium on highly logical, reality-oriented secondary modes of thought (WAIS) to those which allow for more personal, less conventionally constrained thinking (TAT) and finally those which allow for considerably novel, personalized, and regressive modes of thinking (Rorschach). (Allison et al., 1988, p. vii)

Assessment of level of functioning has been greatly facilitated by Holt's innovative procedures for assessing primary and secondary process in the Rorschach (Holt & Havel, 1960).

Psychological Adjustment

The Rorschach, TAT, and WAIS may be employed both to assess adaptive capacities and impairments in psychological functioning and to identify the functions impaired in different psychiatric diagnostic groups. Adjustment and maladjustment may be assessed with reference to the following postulated sequence:

> . . . certain patterns of defense mechanisms are adopted and these determine specific strengths and weaknesses in psychological functioning which then become characteristic of the adjustment of the personality; with the onset of maladjustment, an exaggeration or breakdown in these strengths and weaknesses characteristic for that maladjustment occurs which can be measured; this leads to a diagnostic differentiation. (Rapaport, Menninger, & Schafer, 1947, p. 249)

THE RORSCHACH INKBLOT TEST

Origins and Development of the Test

The origins and development of the Rorschach are best understood by considering the contributions since the 1920s of the many, often colorful, indi-

viduals who have, at different times, proposed quite differing rationales and scoring procedures for quantifying and interpreting responses to the test. The 10 standard inkblots that make up the test are indeed ambiguous and inviting of "projection"; different theorists have seen a remarkable variety of potentialities for psychodiagnosis in the same inkblots. Table 1.3 provides a rough chronology of these developments.

Hermann Rorschach

> The following pages describe the technic of and the results thus far achieved in a psychological experiment which, despite its simplicity, has proved to be of value in research and in general testing. At the outset it must be pointed out that all of the results are predominantly empirical. . . . The conclusions drawn, therefore, are to be regarded more as observations than as theoretical deductions. The theoretical foundation for the experiment is, for the most part, still quite incomplete.
>
> —RORSCHACH (1921, p. 13)

Although several psychologists had previously considered the use of inkblots as test material for eliciting imaginative productions (e.g., Binet & Henri, 1895–1896; Whipple, 1910), it was the Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach (1884–1922) who launched a 10-year systematic investigation of the usefulness of such stimuli in the experimental study of concept formation. From among thousands of trial blots, Rorschach eventually selected a standard set of 10 blots that constituted what he called the "form interpretation test" and that now make up the Rorschach test. Rorschach's (1921) monograph *Psychodiagnostik* (translated into English later as *Psychodiagnostics*) was a "preliminary report" of an experiment conducted on a variety of normal and psychiatric patients using the standard inkblots.

In discussing the results of his experiment, Rorschach (1921) indicated the part of the inkblot used in a response as whole (W), common detail (D), or small detail (Dd). He distinguished among responses that were mainly determined by the form of the blot (F), by the chromatic color of the blot (C), by both (FC, CF), and by the attribution of human movement to the blot (M). Rorschach invoked the notion of "kinesthesia" with reference to the capacity to produce human movement responses (M) to the blots, and contrasted such responses with color responses (C), which he thought reflected extraversion and affectivity. The ratio of M to total C was called the *Erlebnistyp* ("experience balance"), and it corresponded roughly to Jung's introversion–extraversion distinction. He also classified the content of the response (e.g., A = animal figure) and noted original percepts (Orig.). In comparing contemporary scoring categories with those suggested by Rorschach over 80 years ago, one is struck by the extent to which this system appeared to spring almost "full-blown" from a single highly creative person.

TABLE 1.3. A Selected Chronology of Rorschach Scoring and Interpretive Systems

1920s–1930s: Rorschach (1921); Klopfer and Sender (1936); Beck (1937)

1940s: Klopfer and Kelley (1942); Beck (1944, 1945, 1949); Rapaport et al. (1946); Schafer (1948)

1950s: Beck (1952); Phillips and Smith (1953); Klopfer et al. (1954, 1956); Schafer (1954); Piotrowski (1957)

1960s: Beck (1960); Rickers-Ovsiankina (1960); Klopfer and Davidson (1962); Allison et al. (1968); Exner (1969)

1970s: Klopfer et al. (1970); Exner (1974, 1978)

1980s: Exner and Weiner (1982); Exner (1986)

1990s: Exner (1990, 1991, 1993)

Rorschach's untimely death in 1922 at the age of 37 left many unanswered questions concerning such matters as the directions in which his work might have proceeded and the conceptual orientation within which his work might eventually have been organized. Shortly after Rorschach's death, his closest coworker, the psychoanalyst Emil Oberholzer, published a manuscript of Rorschach's titled "The Application of the Interpretation of Form to Psychoanalysis" with Oberholzer's own extensive annotations (Rorschach & Oberholzer, 1924). Although this paper suggested to some later workers that Rorschach would have continued within the psychoanalytic tradition along Freudian lines (e.g., Klopfer & Kelley, 1942), Rorschach's original monograph appears to reflect mainly the influence of associationist psychology, Bleuler, and the early Freud and Jung (Schafer, 1954). Rorschach's definitive biographer has suggested that his orientation was moving in the direction of phenomenology (Ellenberger, 1954), and others have suggested that Rorschach was developing his own theory of personality based on his test (e.g., Acklin & Oliveira-Berry, 1996). Regardless of the direction in which Rorschach might have been moving, his test soon found fertile soil within the psychodynamic community in the United States.

Bruno Klopfer

> Bruno Klopfer came upon the American scene in 1934 and kindled a flame which has since illuminated the paths of thousands of students and colleagues. . . . More than any other teacher in the field, Klopfer demonstrated how clinical judgments and "intuitive feel" can be developed and communicated and how subjective evaluations can be made public with proper teaching, training and experience.
>
> —HERTZ (1970, pp. ix–xii)

Bruno Klopfer (1900–1971) was born in Augsburg, Bavaria, and attended the University of Munich, where he received a PhD at the age of 22. He developed an early interest in Jungian theory and served as a staff member at the Berlin Institute for Child Guidance. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Klopfer moved his family to Zurich, Switzerland, with the help of Carl Jung. While serving as a technician at the Psychotechnic Institute there, he learned how to administer the Rorschach for purposes of employee selection. In 1934 he accepted a position as research associate for Franz Boas in the Department of Anthropology at Columbia University. As Handler (1994) observed,

> Americans were starved for information about the Rorschach in 1934, for there were few people available who could offer training in administration and interpretation. When several graduate students at Columbia University discovered that Klopfer knew the Rorschach, word went through the department like wildfire. (p. 569)

Klopfer's charismatic personality and his insightful analyses of Rorschach protocols created a demand for instruction that was barely met by the many workshops he gave at Columbia; at the University of California–Los Angeles; at Crafts, New York, for armed services personnel; and elsewhere. In contrast to Rorschach's more narrow scientific approach, Klopfer's interpretive style was subjective, intuitive, and broadly eclectic. His contributions to Rorschach scoring and interpretation were prodigious (e.g., Klopfer, Ainsworth, Klopfer, & Holt, 1954; Klopfer & Davidson, 1962; Klopfer et al., 1956; Klopfer & Kelley, 1942; Klopfer, Meyer, Brawer, & Klopfer, 1970).

From a historical standpoint, Klopfer's lasting contributions to the psychodynamic paradigm were as much organizational and administrative as substantive. In 1936 he organized and edited a mimeographed newsletter called the *Rorschach Research Exchange* (Klopfer, 1936), which became the *Rorschach Research Exchange and Journal of Projective Techniques* (Murphy, Stone, Hutt, Deri, & Frank, 1947), which in 1950 became the *Journal of Projective Techniques*, and which in 1971 became the present-day *Journal of Personality Assessment*. In 1939 Klopfer organized and formed the Rorschach Institute to ensure the availability of training in the Rorschach method, and that institute eventually became the Society for Personality Assessment.

Samuel J. Beck

My general orientation remains as stated in 1944. In limiting itself to the individual associations, the book stops short of interpretation. It does not concern itself with whole personality structures. The sole purpose here is to

> provide students with a steady frame of reference. The hope is that, given such a manual of constant usage, it will be possible to work with the test as a stable instrument. . . . To the extent that this is achieved, Rorschach test scoring would become an *operationalist* technic.
>
> —BECK (1949, p. xi; emphasis in original)

In contrast to Klopfer's more intuitive interpretive style, Beck was the prototype of the *empirical* Rorschach scientist. For example, whereas Klopfer emphasized clinical judgment in determining whether the form of a response to a given location of an inkblot was of "good" (F+) or "poor" (F–) quality, Beck insisted on making such judgments with reference to empirical normative data. Nevertheless, Beck's (1960) skill in making "blind" interpretations of Rorschach protocols (given only the age and sex of the respondent) became as legendary as Klopfer's performances (Viglione, 1993).

Upon completing his doctoral dissertation on the Rorschach at the strongly scientific Psychology Department of Columbia University in 1932, Beck studied the Rorschach with Oberholzer in Zurich and, for the most part, remained within the Rorschach–Oberholzer orientation (Beck, 1959, p. 273). Nevertheless, Beck (1936) felt that the Zurich scoring procedures were more artistic than scientific, and he insisted on fixed standards in scoring and interpretation (Beck, 1937). As Exner (1974) noted, "It was almost inevitable that Beck and Klopfer were to disagree on many basic Rorschach issues" (p. 9). Yet these two scoring systems eventually became canonical, and the net effect was that clinical graduate students in the early 1950s (including myself) had to master *both*.

David Rapaport

> How can man know of, and act in accordance with, his environment when his thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of his own nature?
>
> —RAPAPORT (1959b, p. 57)

In summarizing the contributions of David Rapaport (1911–1960) to psychoanalysis and psychology, Gill and Klein (1967) identified the question above as "the central preoccupation in all of Rapaport's theoretical and empirical efforts" (p. 9). Addressing this paradox within psychoanalytic theory required an account of the roles of both drive and reality in human functioning. For Rapaport (1951), this account centered on the organization and pathology of *thought* in reconciling the inherent conflict between drive and drive restraint. Rapaport was critical of theoretical formulations that placed a one-sided emphasis on drive or on environment, and for that reason he was favorably disposed toward Hartmann's (1939) concept of autonomous ego development and Erikson's (1950) theory of psychosocial development. He facilitated the consolidation of the ego psychology movement by translating Hartmann's work into English, and by providing an il-

luminating historical introduction to Erikson's selected papers (Rapaport, 1959a).

Rapaport believed that the Rorschach is best employed as one test in a battery of tests, rather than as an all-purpose instrument for assessing personality. He advocated a relatively simple method of Rorschach administration, using as few scoring categories as possible, and conducting only a "minimal inquiry" (Rapaport et al., 1946). His emphasis was on providing both the novice and the experienced tester with a helpful frame of reference derived from *cumulative experience* that would be easily applicable to each new case.

> And only with such an approach could we avoid the temptation—especially for the beginner—to translate a multitude of highly refined scores into "psychological" statements with the help of a source book of interpretations, and then to throw these psychological "dream-book" statements together in an interpretation-hash. (Rapaport et al., 1946, Vol. II, p. 88)

In formulating what happens psychologically when a patient is asked to respond to a Rorschach card, Rapaport relied upon what was known about perceptual and associative processes in the late 1940s. He emphasized that in everyday life, human perceptions may be thought of as varying along a continuum of degrees of "structuredness," depending on the clarity and familiarity of the stimuli. The literature of perception suggested to him that responses to such stimuli involve such processes as memory, concept formation, attention, concentration, and anticipation. "*These considerations may prompt the examiner to see in the subject's reaction to the Rorschach inkblots a perceptual organizing process which has a fundamental continuity with perception in everyday life*" (Rapaport et al., 1946, Vol. II, p. 90; emphasis in original). Despite this continuity, however, the unstructured and novel nature of the Rorschach test situation brings to the fore an organizing aspect of perception and provides unique insights into the respondent's adjustment or maladjustment.

In the procedures followed at the Menninger Clinic, the respondent was handed a Rorschach card and asked, "What could this be?" and "What does this suggest to you?" Clearly there are associative processes involved in responses to the inkblots as stimuli. But again, the novelty and unfamiliarity of the inkblots make it likely that the respondent's *own* associative patterns and difficulties will be brought to the fore in this situation.

The perceptual and associative processes involved in responses to inkblots were also considered in terms of concept formation, memory, attention, concentration, and anticipation. Overall, Rapaport identified three prominent phases in the process leading to a response to a Rorschach inkblot:

> . . . in the first phase, the salient perceptual features of the blot initiate the association process; in the second, this process pushes beyond these partial perceptual impressions and effects a more or less intensive organizational elaboration of the inkblot; in the third, the perceptual potentialities and limitations of the inkblot act as a regulating reality for the association process itself. (Rapaport et al., 1946, Vol. II, pp. 93–94)

The foregoing summary of Rapaport's rationale for administration and interpretation of the Rorschach test is not meant to suggest that Rapaport's approach to this instrument would be more akin to that of a cognitive psychologist than to that of a psychoanalyst. Rather, his approach stems from the perspective of a psychoanalytic ego psychology that is firmly based on the principles of general psychology. Although there are many examples of this interpretive approach in *Diagnostic Psychological Testing* and in other writings of Rapaport (see Gill, 1967), the practicing clinician is likely to find the writings provided by Rapaport's long-time friend and collaborator Roy Schafer to be more accessible.

Roy Schafer

The original two-volume edition of *Diagnostic Psychological Testing* (Rapaport et al., 1946) was devoted in large part to a detailed description of the results of the Menninger Clinic study contrasting the test responses of different diagnostic groups (e.g., schizophrenic, depressive, and neurotic groups) with each other, and with the responses of a control group (54 randomly selected members of the Kansas Highway Patrol). As noted by Holt in his abridged and edited version of *Diagnostic Psychological Testing* (Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1968), the research project itself was statistically and methodologically flawed, and the results are no longer considered to be compelling (e.g., Kleiger, 1993). The original volumes did not include the kind of broad diagnostic summaries or individual case studies that would be of interest to those who wish to learn interpretive procedures. In that respect, Roy Schafer's *The Clinical Application of Psychological Tests* (1948) may be regarded as a much-needed sequel to the original two volumes.

Schafer's book provided: (1) diagnostic summaries of typical patterns of test response in 19 pathological syndromes and in normal records for the Bellevue Scale, a learning efficiency measure, a sorting test, the Rorschach, a word association test, and the TAT; (2) case studies with full protocols of the aforementioned tests for nine pathological syndromes and an inhibited normal subject; and (3) briefer case studies of nine pathological syndromes with full protocols of selected tests. This book remains one of the major pedagogical achievements in the evolution of the psychodynamic paradigm,

and for many years it was the "bible" for those seeking instruction in the ego-psychological approach to test interpretation.

Schafer's *Psychoanalytic Interpretation in Rorschach Testing* (1954) provided the first full explication of the contributions of psychoanalytic ego psychology to test theory and interpretation. It begins with a remarkable portrait of the "Interpersonal Dynamics in the Test Situation" based on the transference–countertransference dynamics of the psychotherapeutic relationship. The needs and problems of the tester are considered with reference to unconscious reaction tendencies that may be manifested in aspects of the *role* the tester assumes in his or her relationship with the respondent (e.g., voyeuristic, autocratic, oracular, or saintly). The personality characteristics of the tester that are likely to interfere with effective testing are also considered (e.g., rigid defenses against dependency or hostility, uncertain sense of identity, socially inhibited/withdrawn). The needs and problems of the patient are considered as well, with specific reference to the patient's psychological position, violation of privacy, loss of control, dangers of self-confrontation, regressive temptations, dangers of freedom, and psychosexual orientation toward his or her responses.

The more technical portions of Schafer's (1954) book are devoted to an analysis of the response process in Rorschach testing, thematic analysis of the content of Rorschach responses, and criteria for judging the adequacy of interpretations of Rorschach protocols. The major substantive contribution of the book is to be found in the detailed analysis of the psychoanalytic conceptualization of defense and its application (along with case studies) to repression, denial, projection, and obsessive–compulsive defensive operations. Like his mentor David Rapaport, Schafer is a major systematizer of psychoanalytic theory (e.g., Schafer, 1968, 1976); an innovator in the application of psychoanalytic theory to projective testing (e.g., Schafer, 1967); and, as suggested by Table 1.2, a highly influential mentor within the psychodynamic paradigm.

Joel Allison, Sidney Blatt, and Carl Zimet

> . . . our goal is to show how a psychologist working in an ego-psychological framework goes about the process of analyzing a patient's test battery from start to finish and how he synthesizes a rich array of inferences into a meaningful description of personality functioning.
>
> —ALLISON ET AL. (1988, p. vi)

Allison and colleagues' (1988) textbook on the ego-psychological interpretation of the major tests in the Menninger battery provided an updated restatement and extension of the earlier work of Rapaport and colleagues (1946), in light of significant advances in research and interpretation that had occurred since that work (e.g., Holt, 1966). This book has been aptly

described as a Rapaport system for beginners (Auerbach, 1999), to emphasize the exceptional accessibility of the material presented. Concise and informative summaries of the administration, scoring, and interpretation of the WAIS, Rorschach, and TAT are provided from an ego-psychological perspective, along with brief case examples. Consistent with the Rapaport–Schafer position, the interpretive emphasis is on test scores, content or themes of response, style of verbalization, and the interpersonal relationship between tester and patient.

Unlike previous textbooks of interpretation, the Allison and colleagues (1988) text is focused almost exclusively on the test protocols of one person ("Mrs. T"), a randomly selected patient. This innovative format imparts a degree of "clinical realism" to the learning experience. Separate chapters focus on the administration, scoring, and interpretation of the WAIS, TAT, and Rorschach, along with brief case examples. The reader is provided with the full protocol of Mrs. T's responses to each of these tests, and with her referral request, preliminary background information, and material elicited during a brief interview preceding formal testing—in other words, the kinds of information typically available to the tester in a psychiatric setting. As the results of each test are summarized, hypotheses are generated for consideration in the subsequent test. Findings from the WAIS, TAT, and Rorschach are then summarized, and a model test report is provided.

The final part of the book presents the results of Mrs. T's retesting after a period of 2½ years, excerpts from a diary she kept during her early hospitalization, an interview with Mrs. T's therapist concerning the usefulness of the test report, and notes on Mrs. T's life following release from the hospital. For more than three decades, this highly informative and clearly written book has served as an excellent introduction to what successive generations of graduate students have referred to as the "ABZs of psychodiagnostic testing."

John E. Exner, Jr.

> Exner has almost single-handedly rescued the Rorschach and brought it back to life. The result is the resurrection of perhaps the most powerful psychometric instrument ever envisioned.
>
> —American Psychological Association, Board of Professional Affairs (1998, p. 392)

As emphasized in the Introduction, a student's orientation toward research and practice in personality assessment is often influenced by the graduate school he or she attends and by the particular advisor and/or clinical supervisor with whom he or she works most closely. This type of "indoctrination" was almost a necessity for learning the Rorschach during the 1950s, for how else might the student choose among the bewildering variety of

scoring and interpretive systems listed in Table 1.3 for the 1920s–1930s through the 1950s? Although there were many exceptions, the choice most frequently narrowed down to one between the "empirical" system of Beck and the rival "clinical" system of Klopfer. And although there was clearly merit to be found in both systems, it behooved graduate students to accept the choice that had been made by their supervisors—with the notable exception of a graduate student named John Exner.

> How many Rorschachs are there really? No one can say but to guess gives rise to alarm. There are five reasonably distinct systems and so it can be argued that there at least five reasonably distinct Rorschachs. But when the potential combinations of these systems are considered, the possibilities become astronomical. (Exner, 1974, p. 14)

In 1954, when he was a second-year graduate student at Cornell University, Exner had the opportunity of spending a summer studying the Rorschach under the close supervision of Samuel Beck in Chicago.[4] During this period, Exner spent many hours in the library studying the Rorschach test.

> One day he came across a copy of Klopfer and Kelley's (1942) book, *The Rorschach Technique*, which he innocently carried along with him to Beck's house for their daily meeting. Noticing the small green book out of the corner of his eye, Beck asked with some initial suspicion, "What's that?" As Exner showed him the book he noticed Beck's suddenly changed demeanor. "Where did you get that book?" he asked, somewhat tersely. "In the library," a shaken Exner replied. "In *our* library?" asked Beck, as if the book itself had intrusively transgressed its boundaries by its mere presence in the University of Chicago library, Beck's library. (Handler, 1996, pp. 651–652)

Exner spent the following summer and one additional summer studying the Rorschach under Bruno Klopfer and assisting Klopfer in his workshops. Having become a close friend of both Beck and Klopfer, and appreciating their distinctive contributions, Exner recalled: "I had hoped because they were so very nice to me, to get them to sit down in a room with a tape recorder and I would interview them about their differences, and maybe they could come together" (quoted in Handler, 1996, p. 652). They both refused, but Beck suggested that Exner write a paper on the *differences* between the two systems. By this time Exner had become familiar with the work of Piotrowski, of Hertz, and of Rapaport and Schafer, and he decided to write a short monograph comparing all five systems. This "short mono-

[4] The following biographical information is based on Leonard Handler's (1996) interviews with Exner.

graph" eventually became Exner's *The Rorschach Systems* (1969), which Handler (1996) has described in his article title as "The Book That Started It All."

The initial sources on which Exner based the Comprehensive System, his massive revision and standardization of the Rorschach test, are listed in Table 1.4. In assembling materials for his comparative analysis of Rorschach systems, Exner (1969) relied on his personal contacts with the major systematists themselves to ensure accurate presentation of their approaches. The manner in which the systems were being used was determined in a survey of 395 practicing clinicians (Exner & Exner, 1972). The latter findings were disconcerting. Some 22% of clinicians surveyed had abandoned scoring altogether, and of those who continued to score, 75% did not follow any one system consistently. Exner (1974) concluded that "most 'Rorschachers' solve the dilemma of several systems privately by intuitively adding 'a little Klopfer,' a 'dash of Beck,' a few 'grains' of Hertz, and a 'smidgen' of Piotrowski, to their own experience, and call it *The Rorschach*" (p. x).

Exner also surveyed the practices and opinions of highly experienced Rorschach users, and the views of published authors on research methods and problems, before embarking on the first of what would be an enormous number of empirical studies of scoring procedures for Rorschach protocols.

> The goal of this work is to present, in a single format, the "best of the Rorschach." This system draws from each of the systems, incorporating those features which, under careful scrutiny, offer the greatest yield, and adds to them other components based on more recent work with the test. The product, if successful, should be a method which is easily taught, manifests a high interclinician reliability, and which will stand well against the various tests of validity. It is not based on any particular theoretical position, and hopefully, can be useful to both the behaviorist and the phenomenologist. It is predicated on the notion that the Rorschach is one of the best methods available from which a useful description of the uniqueness of the person can be gleaned. (Exner, 1974, pp. x–xi)

Although several "schools" of Rorschach interpretation have been devised by colorful individuals, there is nothing in the history of the test that can be compared with the Exner phenomenon. Those of us who have had the pleasure of meeting Exner (and this is a very large number of persons) can attest to the fact that he belies the image of the aloof, introverted university professor. His outgoing nature and infectious enthusiasm for developing a uniform and empirically sound Rorschach have enabled him to seek the opinions and learn the practices of hundreds of colleagues, and to enlist hundreds of individuals from diverse backgrounds to conduct the

TABLE 1.4. Original Sources for Exner's Comprehensive System

Method	Focus	Source
Comparative analysis	Five major Rorschach systems	Exner (1974)
Interviews and conversations	Positions and attitudes toward systems	Major systematists themselves
30-item questionnaire	Practice and use of major systems	Exner and Exner (1972)
90-item questionnaire	Practices and opinions	131 experienced ABPP Rorschach users
55-item questionnaire	Rorschach research methods and problems	100 published authors of Rorschach research
Analysis of Rorschach protocols	Study and cross-reference of normative baselines	835 Rorschach protocols from more than 150 psychologists

studies emanating from the Rorschach Workshops over the years. Perhaps of equal importance has been his energetic and unswerving commitment to developing standard, reliable, and empirically based procedures for the administration, scoring, and interpretation of the Rorschach test (Exner, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995b; Exner & Weiner, 1982, 1995).

Over the years, Exner has presented the following, in successive editions: (1) detailed rules for administration, inquiry, scoring, and interpretation; (2) evidence on the reliability and validity for individual scales and summary scores; and (3) normative data from a variety of clinical and nonclinical samples. There is little doubt that Exner's Comprehensive System has become a widely employed system of Rorschach administration and scoring. Surveys of graduate students and predoctoral interns in psychology suggested that when they are taught the Rorschach, most of them are taught the Comprehensive System (e.g., Hilsenroth & Handler, 1995). But ironically, although Rorschach scoring and interpretation can no longer be considered a "seat-of-the-pants" procedure, criticism of the test from other quarters has, if anything, *increased* in recent years (Archer, 1999; Meyer, 1999). Critical opinion on the validity of the Rorschach constitutes one of the grimmest chapters in the history of personality assessment.

THE VALIDITY OF THE RORSCHACH

> I would like to offer the reader some advice here. If a professional psychologist is "evaluating" you in a situation in which you are at risk

> and asks you for responses to inkblots . . . walk out of that psychologist's office. Going through with such an examination creates the danger of having a serious decision made about you on totally invalid grounds.
>
> —DAWES (1994, pp. 152–153)

Robyn Dawes's strongly held opinion concerning the validity of the Rorschach is not at all unusual. A sampling over the years of critical reviews (most from the highly respected *Mental Measurements Yearbook* series) reveals many of them to be equally critical:

> What passes for research in this field is usually naively conceived, inadequately controlled, and only rarely subjected to usual standards of experimental rigor. (Wittenborn, 1949, p. 394)
>
> There is no evidence of any marked relationship between Rorschach scoring categories combined in any approved statistical fashion into a scale, and diagnostic category, when the association between the two is tested on a population other than that from which the scale was derived. (Eysenck, 1959, p. 277)
>
> . . . it seems not unreasonable to recommend that the Rorschach be altogether abandoned in clinical practice and that students of clinical psychology not be required to waste their time learning the technique. (Jensen, 1965, p. 509)
>
> . . . the monotonous overall conclusions have been that there is little evidence to support the claims made for the technique by its proponents. The results of the research published subsequent to the last edition of the year book have not perceptibly altered this grim picture of the reliability and validity of the Rorschach procedure. (Eron, 1965, p. 495)
>
> Perhaps the most compelling question that can be asked about the Rorschach at this time is whether yet another review of this test is, in fact, necessary or even desirable. (Reznikoff, 1972, p. 446)
>
> The general lack of predictive validity for the Rorschach raises serious questions about its continued use in clinical practice. (Peterson, 1978, p. 1045)

But the most damning of all critical judgments is reflected in the fact that the Rorschach is no longer reviewed in the *Mental Measurements Yearbooks* (Dawes, 1994, p. 151).

Many of the reviews quoted above were, of course, "pre-Exner." Blanket psychometric criticisms of Rorschach research should now be tempered in light of Exner's subsequent empirical work with Rorschach scoring categories. But the specter of "predictive validity" still looms large:

> Interestingly, the question of establishing the *validity* of the interpretive process, the extent to which it results in accurate interpretations, is not addressed in Exner's work. Thus, there is no scientific reason to conclude that the Comprehensive System is any more valid than the earlier, simple scoring

> and interpretation procedures it was designed to replace. (Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997, pp. 96–97; emphasis in original)

Moreover, the utility of learning the Exner scoring system has been questioned:

> The Rorschach can be administered and scored in a reliable manner, but the training that is necessary to learn how to score reliably the 168 variables of the Exner Comprehensive System is daunting at best. (Widiger & Saylor, 1998, p. 162)

The last quotation is from a chapter in the 11-volume *Comprehensive Clinical Psychology*—a project that was designed, as the title states, to provide comprehensive coverage of the entire field of clinical psychology (Bellack & Hersen, 1998). Perhaps not surprisingly, this massive work does not include a separate chapter on Rorschach testing of adults.

THE COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM AND THE PSYCHODYNAMIC PARADIGM

Debate over the Comprehensive System

There are two main reasons why the current widespread acceptance of the Comprehensive System has not resulted in a consolidation of the Rorschach within the psychodynamic paradigm: (1) The Comprehensive System deemphasizes the "projective" aspects of responses to the cards, and (2) this system is essentially atheoretical (or at least theory-neutral) in nature. With respect to projection, Dawes (1994) observed: "The [Comprehensive System] presupposes that the blots actually do look like certain things. Which is the exact *opposite* of the rationale for the Rorschach" (p. 149; emphasis in original). Similarly, Shontz and Green (1992) made the point that "It encourages the use of the Rorschach as a standardized test rather than as a minimally structured instrument. . . . Thus, the Exner system may have transformed the instrument into something that its originator and many of its users might not wish it to be" (pp. 149–150). With respect to theory, it is true that some of the scoring categories of Rapaport and Schafer have been incorporated into the Comprehensive System, but psychoanalytic rationales for interpretation—or, for that matter, theoretical rationales in general—are clearly avoided: "In other words, the presence or absence of an underpinning theory is irrelevant, as the data are the data" (Exner, 1997, p. 41).

Exner's (1989) insistence that the Rorschach does not assess projection has alienated some members of the psychodynamic community (e.g., Aronow, Reznikoff, & Moreland, 1995; Kramer, 1991). Aronow, Reznikoff, and Moreland (1994) argue that it was "a fundamental mistake to try

to 'regiment' this clinically sensitive procedure into some sort of inkblot version of an MMPI [the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory]" (p. 18). On the other hand, major proponents of the Comprehensive System (e.g., Weiner, 1994) have also alienated the more psychometrically oriented members of the Rorschach community by arguing that the Rorschach is not a psychological test, but rather a flexible method of interviewing not constrained by traditional psychometric principles.[5] The Comprehensive System has without doubt improved the psychometric status of the Rorschach as a testing instrument, but in a sense it may now be an instrument without a paradigm. Interestingly, the paradigm with which the Comprehensive System of the Rorschach has been most compared in recent times is the *empirical* paradigm.

The Rorschach and the MMPI

Competition

Parker, Hunsley, and Hanson (1988) conducted a meta-analytic comparison of the Rorschach and the MMPI with respect to their reliability, stability, and validity in 411 published studies and concluded:

> The MMPI and Rorschach are both valid, stable, and reliable under certain circumstances. When either test is used in the manner for which it was designed and validated, its psychometric properties are likely to be adequate for either clinical or research purposes. (p. 373)

This conclusion, together with other promising findings from meta-analyses of the MMPI and Rorschach (Atkinson, 1986) and of the Rorschach alone (e.g., Parker, 1983) appeared to grant equal "status" to the Rorschach and the MMPI as clinical assessment instruments (e.g., Ganellen, 1996a).

Garb, Florio, and Grove (1998) strongly contested the results of meta-analyses that appeared to grant equal status to the Rorschach and MMPI:

> When we reanalyzed the data from the most widely cited meta-analysis [Parker et al., 1988], we found that for confirmatory studies . . . the [MMPI] explained 23% to 30% of the variance, whereas the Rorschach explained only 8% to 13% of the variance. *These results indicate that the Rorschach is not as valid as the MMPI.* (p. 402; emphasis added)

In a paradigm-free "open market," it would appear that the Rorschach test fares less well than the MMPI. But closer examination of the commit-

[5] This opinion is specifically disavowed by Exner (1997, pp. 40–41).

ments of the participants in this contest suggests that the market is not entirely "paradigm-free." For example, Paul Meehl (1954), the conceptual architect of the empirical paradigm, was well known for his advocacy of "statistical" (empirical) rather than "clinical" (judgmental) prediction. In the prediction of socially relevant criterion measures (the goal of the empirical paradigm), Meehl was concerned about the fallibility of clinical judgment and decision making, and his concern is still shared by other members of the empirical paradigm who have been strongly influenced by Meehl, such as Garb (1998), Grove (Grove & Meehl, 1996), and Dawes (1994).

In the controversy over statistical versus clinical prediction, it was Robert Holt (1958), a distinguished member of the psychodynamic paradigm, who first presented the strongest case for clinical judgment, and Holt's position is strongly endorsed by the originator of the Comprehensive System:

> Holt also makes a strong argument that prediction, as such, is not an end in itself. Rather, understanding is at least equally important as a scientific goal. Holt could easily have gone one step further to emphasize that understanding is the principal goal of the clinical assessment routine, and that prediction, in many instances, is of somewhat lesser importance. (Exner, 1974, p. 4)

Although the Rorschach Comprehensive System may no longer be affiliated with the psychodynamic paradigm, some of the underlying assumptions of that paradigm concerning the importance of "understanding," as opposed to "predicting," still remain.

Integration

That the two personality tests most frequently employed in clinical assessment (the MMPI and the Rorschach) should be viewed as "competitive" is to lose sight of the fact that the tests arose from quite different paradigms. On the other hand, the fact that they do represent such different paradigms could be fueling the intensity of their competition. In this context, Widiger (2001) has expressed the opinion that this onslaught on the Rorschach is part of a wider professional dispute. He has argued that the Rorschach is being attacked not only because its validity and utility have been exaggerated by its proponents, but also because it is the instrument of, and a symbol for, the psychodynamic perspective. In his opinion, the attack is not simply on the Rorschach; it is on the psychodynamic perspective (and on intuitively oriented practicing clinicians).

In any case, the results of comparative studies have suggested that there is little relation between scores from the Rorschach and from the MMPI, even when the scores purportedly measure the same constructs

(e.g., Archer & Krishnamurthy, 1993a, 1993b). On the basis of these and other studies, Archer (1996) asserted: "An extensive literature, spanning 50 years and 45 published investigations, leads to the conclusion that the Rorschach and the MMPI bear little or no meaningful relationship to each other" (p. 504). Although hope has been held out for the "integration" of the Rorschach and the MMPI in personality assessment (e.g., Ganellen, 1996b), and conceptual commonalities between the two instruments have been identified on a high level of abstraction (see Chapter 6), the increasingly atheoretical use of the Rorschach could eventually result in invidious comparisons being made with the ultraempirical and highly successful MMPI-2.

CONTRASTING VIEWS ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RORSCHACH

After over 50 years of disagreement about the utility of the Rorschach, the field of personality assessment still remains strongly divided. Most journals on assessment, and many others, have devoted considerable space to the presentation of extensive and at times even scathing critiques of the validity of the Rorschach (e.g., Burns & Viglione, 1996; Dawes, 1999; Garb, 1999; Garb et al., 1998; Wood & Lilienfeld, 1999; Wood, Lilienfeld, Garb, & Nezworski, 2000; Wood, Nezworski, Garb, & Lilienfeld, 2001; Wood, Nezworski, & Stejskal, 1997; Wood, Nezworski, Stejskal, & Garven, 2001; Wood, Nezworski, Stejskal, Garven, & West, 1999), as well as equally passionate rejoinders (e.g., Acklin, 1999, Exner, 1995a, 1996, 2001; Ganellen, 1996a; Hiller, Rosenthal, Bornstein, Berry, & Brunell-Neuleib, 1999; Meyer, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2001; Weiner, 1996, 1999, 2000a, 2000b).

Irving Weiner (1995) has observed that "those who currently believe the Rorschach is an unscientific or unsound test with limited utility have not read the relevant literature of the last 20 years; or, having read it, they have not grasped its meaning" (p. 73). This situation may be due, Weiner (1996) later noted, to the fact that

> the Rorschach will yield valid inferences primarily in relation to conditions and events that are largely determined by known personality characteristics and in which nonpersonality variance plays little part or can be carefully controlled; hence, for example, the predictive validity of Rorschach variables tends to be less extensive than their concurrent validity. (p. 212)

In contrast, Sechrest, Stickle, and Stewart (1998) concluded that the Rorschach may be best characterized as what Richard Feynman (1985) referred to as "cargo cult science":

> In the South Seas there is a cargo cult of people. During the war they saw airplanes land with lots of good materials, and they want the same thing to happen now. So they've arranged to make things like runways, to put fires along the sides of the runways, to make a wooden hut for a man to sit in, with two wooden pieces on his head like headphones and bars of bamboo sticking out like antennas—he's the controller—and they wait for the airplanes to land. They're doing everything right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly the way it looked before. But it doesn't work. No airplanes land. So I call these things cargo cult science, because they follow all the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they're missing something essential, because the planes don't land. (p. 340)

In the view of Sechrest and colleagues, "use of the Rorschach has failed to demonstrate convincing evidence of validity in decades of attempts to find it. The planes still don't land" (p. 24).

THE THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST

Psychoanalytic Theory of Responses to the TAT

Holt (1951) suggested that the seventh chapter of Freud's (1900) *The Interpretation of Dreams* was a fertile source of hypotheses for investigating the processes underlying the production of imaginative stories to TAT cards. The "day residue" of dreams, according to Freud, is an event that has occurred during the preceding day. The theme of this residue leads to a train of associations that touch upon a repressed wish. But the day residue itself is not conflicted, and an elaboration of its theme permits a "partial discharge" of an unacceptable impulse in a form that is *related*, but not *equivalent*, to that impulse. Telling a TAT story may serve the same function. However, the TAT story will not be a direct expression of the unacceptable impulse; it will be a "secondary elaboration" of the underlying theme that "is fashioned into a more or less coherent, usually dramatic form" (Holt, 1951, p. 184).

The TAT and the Menninger Battery

The TAT was devised by Henry Murray, the founder of the personological paradigm (Morgan & Murray, 1935); it has continued to play a central role in that paradigm, in which the primary focus is on the life story of individuals (Cramer, 1996). The test has also played an important role within the psychodynamic paradigm, because it was a central component of the original Menninger battery:[6]

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[6] David Rapaport and Robert Holt provided input to Murray when he was developing the TAT (Morgan, 1995).

> It was our purpose to include a test in our battery which should give us an appraisal of the subject's experiencing of his own world and of himself as a part of it. In a sense, we wanted to obtain thereby a direct picture of the material dealt with by the intellectual conceptual apparatus and personality dynamics of the subject which were incidentally indicated by the other tests. Therefore we had to find a test which would supply us with more than incidental information about these contents and attitudes. . . . Our choice fell on the Thematic Apperception Test. (Rapaport et al., 1946, pp. 396–397)

When respondents are asked to make up imaginative stories from ambiguous pictures of people in a variety of settings and to tell what the characters are thinking and feeling, the *ideational content* of their responses differs qualitatively from that produced in response to the WAIS or to the Rorschach. Whereas the WAIS calls for consensually agreed-upon "knowledge," and the Rorschach appears to call for statements of what the blot "really is," the TAT calls for fantasies and imaginative products that represent a different type of thought:

> . . . the characteristics, attitudes, and striving of figures in the TAT stories are all memory products; as such they are subject to the laws of memory organization which order single experiences into patterns conforming with the emotional constellations of the subject's life. This is the theoretical basis for assuming that the TAT stories may allow for inferences concerning the make-up of the subject and his world. (Rapaport et al., 1946, pp. 419–420)

Interpretive Principles

Clinical experience has established a set of normative expectations for the stories produced to each card of the TAT. For example, Card 1 (which depicts a young boy contemplating a violin) "usually elicits the subject's attitude toward duty (compliance, coercion, rebellion) and frequently also gives some inkling as to his aspirations (difficulty, hope, achievement)" (Rapaport et al., 1946, p. 421). Perceptual distortions may be assessed with reference to this normative base (e.g., the respondent fails to notice the violin). Highly normative stories are analogous to "popular" responses to Rorschach cards, and Rapaport and colleagues (1946) consider these to be "clichés" that are not especially revealing, although they suggest that one may infer the "rules" by which the respondent selects clichés from the interrelationships among clichés.

A normative story for Card 1 would describe a boy sitting in front of a violin who does not want to play it and would rather be out playing baseball with his friends; as such, this is not very revealing. On the other hand, a story in which "the child's father is a great musician who has died and the

child is holding the violin with the determination to take the place of his father in the musical world and to care for his mother" (Rapaport et al., 1946, p. 415) strongly suggests an Oedipal constellation. Similarly, consider the brief story given by a patient with psychotic depression: "A boy looking at a violin. . . . What led up to it? I guess a string broke, is that it? What the outcome will be? He'll stop playing. (Feel?) He feels sad" (Schafer, 1948, p. 296). Schafer noted that "The theme, stated with simple finality, is that one gives up in the face of even minor difficulty" (1948, p. 299).

As the preceding example suggests, Rapaport and colleagues (1946) emphasized the importance of attending to the *affective tone* of a story, as well as to its content. They also emphasized the importance of assessing strivings and defenses, compliance with instructions, consistency of the stories (both interindividual and intraindividual), and obstacles or barriers. Schafer (1967), in particular, has emphasized the importance of attending to *narrative style*: "A TAT story has this in common with poetry: we cannot grasp its full import if we consider only its content, its narrative detail" (p. 114). Consider the narrative style in a story given to Card 1 by a 52-year-old Hollywood film story editor with a long history of heavy drinking:

> Now from this I'm supposed to tell you what? [Instructions repeated.] He has just finished practicing and . . . and he is sitting there reflecting . . . over his violin . . . on a score which he's just tackled. Is that enough [Make up more of a story.] . . . [How does he feel?] . . . I should say he feels a little . . . hmmm, disturbed, no, not disturbed; well, we'll [mumbles something], we'll say a little disturbed by the fact that he hadn't brought off, what will we say, the Scarlatti exercise to his satisfaction. He is a sensitive, thoughtful child who, like myself, needs a haircut. You can leave that out if you wish. Okay, that takes care of Buster. Oh, you put everything down [noticing verbatim recording]. (Schafer, 1967, p. 116)

Schafer then provided a detailed and insightful analysis of the extent to which this man was acutely aware that *he* was making up a story (1967, pp. 117–128).

In their updated presentation of the Rapaport–Gill–Schafer system, Allison and colleagues (1988) provided the responses of "Mrs. T" to Card 1:

> Uh—this child—uh—[sigh] has been studying music for a few years. He's—he feels very deeply about music. He can hear it—hear lovely sounds in his head, but he can't get them to come out of his violin. At the time of the picture, he's sitting there very unhappy, because he can't create anything himself. And—uh—so he gets up and he—and very frustrated, he smashes his violin. (pp. 110–111)

The authors emphasized the initial passivity and lack of action, which later became an eruption of affect and aggression. They also called attention to the initial ambiguity regarding the sex of the "child" (uncertain sexual identity?) and the subsequent identification of the child as male (belated capacity for facing identity problems?). "Studying music for a few years" was and is normatively less common than the boy's having recently obtained the violin, and this extended time span was seen as emphasizing the boy's failure to "get them to come out of his violin" (depressive tone). This juxtaposition of unhappiness and not being able to get sounds out suggested to these authors a state of tension and "a longing for an active role which is finally and only expressed through violent, volcanic activity" (p. 111).

THE WECHSLER SCALES

Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer

It is not surprising that the intelligence test developed by David Wechsler (1939) should be included in the Menninger battery of the 1940s, since the principal role of psychologists at that time was that of "intelligence testers," and the Bellevue Scale was the state of the art within that realm (as its successors are today). What may be surprising is that Rapaport and colleagues (1946) had concluded, "In our clinical work, the I.Q. level proved to be of almost no diagnostic significance" (p. 51); they chose to emphasize instead the quantitative *interrelations* among subscale scores of this test, as well as the *qualitative* aspects of responses to individual items. They stated their intention "to demonstrate that the different types of maladjustment tend to have different distinguishable and recognizable impairments of test performance" (p. 39).

The rationale for this approach was based on five premises:

> [1] . . . one must consider not only every subtest score, but every single response and every part of every response as significant and representative of the subject . . . [2] one may gain some understanding of the subject by comparing the successes and failures on a given type of test item . . . [3] the relationship of the score of one subtest to the scores of other subtests is also representative of the subject . . . [4] the relationship of all the Verbal scores to all the Performance scores is significant of the makeup of the subject . . . [5] the data to which the above four points refer must be considered in the light of findings of tests other than those of intelligence. (Rapaport et al., 1946, pp. 40–41)

Scatter Analysis

The Wechsler scales appear especially well suited for profile analysis, because all subtest scores are expressed in directly comparable standard scores. From

the outset, Wechsler was interested in clinical applications of the Bellevue Scale and its successors that examined indices derived from the interrelations among test scores. For example, he derived an index of "mental deterioration," which was based on the difference in standard scores between subtests that "hold" with age and subtests that "don't hold." Rapaport and colleagues (1946) employed a related method, which became known as "scatter analysis" and which was defined as "the relationship of any two scores, or of any single score to the central tendency of all the scores" (p. 48). In this method, the Vocabulary subtest, because of its centrality and stability, served as a baseline of comparison for the analysis of deviations on other subtests. Configural patterns of this nature were examined in relation to various indices of psychopathology. These analyses yielded findings that were generalized in this form: "An extreme discrepancy between Digits Forward and Digits Backward is in general indicative of psychosis" (p. 193). Such analyses received considerable criticism on psychometric grounds (e.g., Schofield, 1952), and as Anastasi (1976) concluded, "Three decades of research on these various forms of pattern analysis with the Wechsler scales have provided little support for their diagnostic value" (p. 466).

Qualitative Analysis

A less controversial use of the Wechsler scales in psychodiagnostic testing was the analysis of qualitative features of an individual's responses. This involved (1) formulation of the cognitive and emotional demands of an item, and of how the respondent met these demands; and (2) attending to the diagnostic implications of verbalizations (whether right or wrong). For example, the items in the Comprehension subtest were judged to require not only the activation, selection, and organization of information, but the delaying of first impulses as well:

> In the question, "What should you do if, while sitting in the movies, you were the first person to discover a fire?" the impulsive response, "Holler fire!" must be suppressed if a "good response" is to be achieved. Many self-controlling impulsive people will begin, "I won't holler fire, but rather . . . "; others, who are less contained, will say: "I know one shouldn't holler fire but I am afraid that's what I'd do." (Rapaport et al., 1946, p. 112)

Roy Schafer

> Unfortunately most research into the clinical usefulness of tests has attempted to correlate test "signs" with diagnoses and not with characteristics of thinking or behavior. . . . This is a fault of the statistical investigations in *Diagnostic Psychological Testing*. It is a roundabout method and can never yield conclusive results.
>
> —SCHAFER (1948, p. 22)

Schafer placed a heavy emphasis on a patient's distinctive style of thinking and problem solving, as revealed in the "verbalized end products" (1948, p. 17) of thought initiated by the variety of problem situations found in the subtests of the WAIS. He viewed such thought processes as involving past intellectual achievements (and liabilities), and the application of these achievements to the succession of challenges represented by the different problem situations. They also, he believed, reflect the effectiveness of the patient's "characteristic-adjustment efforts" (1948, p. 18).

A response to the Comprehension item concerning being lost in the forest in the daytime may be technically correct but may also be diagnostically revealing of the patient's characteristic efforts at adjustment, as in the following response to this item given by an obsessive–compulsive patient:

> "If I were lost in the forest in the daytime I might follow the sun . . . or go by the moss on the north side of the trees . . . or maybe follow a stream. Do I have a compass? If I had one I'd . . . (etc.)." (Which would you do?) "It depends on the terrain: if . . . (etc.)." (Schafer, 1948, p. 25)

Schafer's sequel to *Diagnostic Psychological Testing* (1948) solidified the psychodynamic paradigm by presenting concrete case studies that illustrated the value of qualitative analysis of intelligence test protocols, and by deemphasizing the controversial scatter-analytic findings of the Menninger research project.

Allison, Blatt, and Zimet

A concise and updated presentation of the Rapaport–Schafer position on interpreting the WAIS within the psychodynamic paradigm was presented by Allison and colleagues (1988). On the basis of their combined clinical and research experience (e.g., Blatt, Allison, & Baker, 1965) and their familiarity with developments in the Menninger approach to WAIS interpretation (e.g., Mayman, Schafer, & Rapaport, 1951), these authors provided a useful overview of interpretive principles. Table 1.5 is an attempt to summarize, in highly abbreviated form, the overall structure of Allison and colleagues' presentation. They began by noting that both the Rorschach and the TAT are presented in such a manner as to encourage the respondent to give free rein to imaginative flights of fancy and free association. In contrast, the WAIS presents the respondent with a number of different types of structured situations to which he or she must respond in an organized and realistic fashion, *without* being influenced by distracting unconscious materials or by defensive operations called forth by such materials. Each subtest of the WAIS may be classified with respect to the psychological function required by the task, and unusually high or low scores on a given subtest (with reference to the baseline of Vocabulary) may be interpreted as reflect-

ing either facilitating or inhibiting influences of psychodynamic factors on the acquisition or performance of the task required by the subtest.

In this context, Vocabulary (which correlates about .85 with Full Scale IQ) represents the breadth of concepts, ideas, and experience acquired in a lifetime. "The acquisition of these concepts and their availability to memory is contingent both on innate ability and on an enriched early life experience" (Allison et al., 1988, p. 24). Because of its demonstrated temporal stability and relative resistance to neurological impairment and psychological disturbance, Vocabulary serves as a baseline against which deviations in other subtests may be evaluated. Like Vocabulary, Information calls for the wealth of available information acquired by innate ability and life experience, but this subtest is more vulnerable to defensive processes. Highly driven efforts to acquire a great store of information reflect "intellectual ambitiousness" (high score in relation to Vocabulary). Repressive tendencies to block out memories have long been known to be associated with an impoverished store of information. Conversely, individuals with obsessive–compulsive tendencies will tend to obtain a relatively high score on this subtest.

"Mrs. T," the patient whose protocols were interpreted most completely by these authors, obtained a Full Scale IQ of 120 on the WAIS, reflecting her superior intellectual potential. Her elevated score on Comprehension suggested social conventionality and good judgment. The authors qualified this conclusion, however:

> With Comprehension higher than Information, a predominantly hysterical organization or character structure would be indicated. This interpretation follows from the notion that her relatively reduced fund of information stems from the use of repression as a major defense mechanism and the counterbalancing by high Comprehension indicates an outwardly directed orientation towards social conventionality and conformity. (Allison et al., 1988, p. 61)

CURRENT TRENDS WITHIN THE PSYCHODYNAMIC PARADIGM

Within the last three decades, theory and method within the psychodynamic paradigm of personality assessment have evolved into an object relations perspective that is highly compatible with contemporary formulations of social cognition, information processing, attachment research, and ego development (see Westen, 1990, 1998). Sidney Blatt and his associates at Yale have been primarily responsible for this paradigm shift. From the early 1950s until his untimely death in 1960, Rapaport contributed to the devel-

TABLE 1.5. Clinical Interpretation of the WAIS Subtests

WAIS subtest	Psychological function	Interpretation
Vocabulary	Breadth of concepts, ideas, and experience	Baseline to which other tests may be compared
Information	Wealth of available information	Intellectual ambitiousness (high); especially hindered by repression (low)
Comprehension	Grasp of social conventionality and social judgment	Hyperconventionality and naiveté (high); impairment of judgment (low); diminished interest in social interaction (low)
Similarities	Abstractness of verbal concept formation	Obsessive and paranoid modes of thought (high); impaired thought processes (low); organic impairment (low)
Digit Span	Rote memory and recall (attention)	Lack of anxiety, blandness, *belle indifference*; anxiety, intrusion of drive derivatives (low); brain damage (low)
Arithmetic	Concentration and use of prior skills	Narcissistic and hysterical persons avoid active, effortful ideation and the elaboration of internal experience (low)
Picture Arrangement	Capacity to anticipate social events and their consequences and to plan effective courses of action	Cautious, guarded, hyperalert paranoids, glib psychopaths (high)
Picture Completion	Visual organization and capacity to observe inconsistencies and incongruities	Hyperalert and hypervigilant paranoids (high); obsessive–compulsives (high); concerns over body intactness and passivity (low)
Object Assembly	Capacity to grasp a whole pattern by anticipating interrelations of parts	Concerns over bodily integration and intactness (low); blocking on specific item—e.g., "hand" (concerns over aggression and masturbation) (low)
Block Design	Concept formation task involving both analysis and synthesis	Blandness and lack of anxiety (high); schizoids (high); organic impairment (low)
Digit Symbol	Capacity to utilize energy in a simple task	Overcompliant striving and need for achievement (high); depressive lack of energy output (low)

Note. Data from Allison, Blatt, and Zimet (1988, pp. 23–33).

opment of ego psychology and its application to personality assessment; from the early 1970s until the present, Blatt has contributed to the development of object relations theory and its application to current personality assessment methods.

Within the context of a developmental theory of internal representations of both self and others, meaningful contrasts have been made between self-definition and interpersonal relatedness (Blatt & Blass, 1996)—constructs of far-ranging theoretical significance (see Chapter 6). These constructs have been coordinated with issues of separateness and attachment (Blatt & Blass, 1990), narcissism and object love (Erlich & Blatt, 1985), and self-criticism and dependency (Blatt, Quinlan, Chevron, McDonald, & Zuroff, 1982). The theory has also been applied to specific developmental pathologies, such as schizophrenia (Blatt & Wild, 1976), depression (Blatt & Zuroff, 1992), and "borderline" conditions (Blatt & Auerbach, 1988), as well as to topics as diverse as therapeutic change (Blatt & Ford, 1994) and modes of representation in art (Blatt with Blatt, 1984).

> The study of the representation of the human form on the Rorschach is an ideal data base for assessing an individual's representational world—his conception of people, including himself, and their actual and potential interactions. The representation of people, that is, object representations, have both structure and content. (Blatt & Lerner, 1983b, p. 8)

The structural aspects of object representations are emphasized in the Rorschach scoring system developed by Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, and Glick (1976), which provides a developmental analysis of object representations in terms of such categories as differentiation, articulation, and integration of object and action. The content and affective themes of object representations are emphasized in the Rorschach scoring system developed by Mayman (1967), which emphasizes phenomenological dimensions such as affect states, ego states, experience of self, and sense of identity. A useful comparison of the research programs of Blatt at Yale and Mayman at the University of Michigan was provided by Blatt and Lerner (1983a, pp. 234–239). Both programs employed the Rorschach, TAT, and dreams in the assessment of object representations.

An object relations scoring system for the TAT has been developed by Westen (1991), in which stories are rated for complexity of representations of people, affective tone of relationship paradigms, capacity for emotional investment, and understanding of social causality. A similar scoring system has been developed for the Picture Arrangement subtest of the WAIS (Westen, 1991). In sum, the three major instruments of the original Menninger battery continue to show promise under a revised conceptual orientation that is most compatible with current thinking in personality, social, clinical, and developmental psychology.